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User: SBRADBURY

Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman

Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson

Other Claims
Date
1/22/2016

Judge
New Case Filed - Other Claims

Douglas Paul Payne

Filing: K7 - Filing a foreign judgment Paid by: Evans Craven & Lackie, Atty Douglas Paul Payne
Receipt number: 0000158 Dated: 1/22/2016 Amount: $27.00 (Check) For:
Coeur d'Alene Tribe (plaintiff)
Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of Foreign Judgment

Douglas Paul Payne

Clerk's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment

Douglas Paul Payne

Plaintiff: Coeur d'Alene Tribe Appearance Everett B Coulter Jr

Douglas Paul Payne

1/28/2016

Judgment Creditors Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment

Douglas Paul Payne

2/26/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Tentative Hearing-Paperwork not filed 03/23/2016
11 :00 AM) motion on foreign judgment (John Harper, Atty)

Douglas Paul Payne

3/7/2016

Filing: K7 - Filing a foreign judgment Paid by: Coulter, Everett B Jr
(attorney for Coeur d'Alene Tribe) Receipt number: 0000522 Dated:
3/7/2016 Amount: $27.00 (Check) For: Coeur d'Alene Tribe (plaintiff)

Douglas Paul Payne

Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment

Douglas Paul Payne

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of
Foreign Judgment

Douglas Paul Payne

Affidavit of Everett B. Coulter, Jr., in Support of Petitioner's Motion for
Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment

Douglas Paul Payne

Note for Hearing Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign
Judgment

Douglas Paul Payne

Motion for Order of Disqualification and Assignment of New Judge
Pursuant to IRCP 40(0)(1)

Douglas Paul Payne

3/9/2016

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 03/23/2016 11 :00 AM: Douglas Paul Payne
Hearing Vacated motion on foreign judgment (John Harper, Atty) 3/11/2016

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Douglas Paul Payne

Order Assigning Magistrate on Disqualification (McGee)

Daniel J. McGee

Change Assigned Judge

Daniel J. McGee

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/13/2016 09:30 AM) Motion re Daniel J. McGee
Recognition of Foreign Judgment
Notice Of Hearing

Daniel J. McGee

3/22/2016

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: NIWRA Receipt number: 0000680 Dated:
3/22/2016 Amount: $16.00 (Cash)

Daniel J. McGee

3/25/2016

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Moffatt Thomas, Attys Receipt number: 0000713
Dated: 3/25/2016 Amount: $21.00 (Credit card)

Daniel J. McGee

Miscellaneous Payment: Court Assistance Services Fee Paid by: Moffatt
Thomas, Attys Receipt number: 0000713 Dated: 3/25/2016 Amount:
$3.00 (Credit card)

Daniel J. McGee

Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Moffatt Thomas,
Attys Receipt number: 0000713 Dated: 3/25/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit
card)

Daniel J. McGee

5/6/2016

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Daniel J. McGee
Foreign Judgment

\E.
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Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman

Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson

Other Claims
Date
5/6/2016

Judge
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Daniel J. McGee
Paid by: Norman M Semanko, Atty Receipt number: 0001089 Dated:
5/6/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Johnson, Donna {defendant) and
Johnson, Kenneth (defendant)
Defendant: Johnson, Kenneth Appearance Norman M. Semanko

5/13/2016

Daniel J. McGee

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 05/13/2016 09:30 AM: Scott L Wayman
Hearing Held Motion re Recognition of Foreign Judgment
Court Minutes

Scott L Wayman

Order ReAssignment of Judge (Wayman)

Daniel J. McGee

Change Assigned Judge

Scott L Wayman

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 06/10/2016 11:00 AM) motion on Scott L Wayman
foreign judgment (cont. from 5.13)
5/18/2016

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Gazette Record Receipt number: 0001174
Dated: 5/18/2016 Amount: $28.00 (Check)

Scott L Wayman

5/23/2016

Order of Reassignment (Wayman)

Scott L Wayman

6/2/2016

Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson In opposition fot Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Scott L Wayman
Recognition of Foreign Judgment

6/8/2016

Coeurd'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson

Scott L Wayman

Memorandum in Oppostition to Plaintiffs motion to strike affidavit of
Kenneth Johnson

Scott L Wayman

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 6/10/2016
Time: 11:16 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury
Tape Number:

Scott L Wayman

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Carla Woempner Receipt number: 0001352
Dated: 6/10/2016 Amount: $12.00 (Credit card)

Scott L Wayman

Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Carla Woempner
Receipt number: 0001352 Dated: 6/10/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card)

Scott L Wayman

6/10/2016

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 06/10/2016 11 :00 AM: Scott L Wayman
Hearing Held motion on foreign judgment (cont. from 5.13)
7/15/2016

Memorandum Opinion

Scott L Wayman

Judgment

Scott L Wayman

Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment

Scott L Wayman

Civil Disposition entered for: Johnson, Donna, Defendant; Johnson,
Kenneth, Defendant; Coeur d'Alene Tribe, Plaintiff. Filing date: 7/15/2016
(Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment granted)

Scott L Wayman

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Scott L Wayman

Date: 12/6/2016
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Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman

Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson

Other Claims
Judge

Date
7/28/2016

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Gazette Record Receipt number: 0001731
Dated: 7/28/2016 Amount: $28.00 (Check)

Scott L Wayman

8/26/2016

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: Semanko, Norman M. (attorney for Johnson, Kenneth) Receipt
number: 0001964 Dated: 8/26/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For:
Johnson, Donna (defendant) and Johnson, Kenneth (defendant)

Scott L Wayman

Notice Of Appeal

Scott L Wayman

Motion for Order Extending Stay of Enforcement of Judgment

Scott L Wayman

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Scott L Wayman

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Scott L Wayman

Appeal Filed In District Court

Scott L Wayman

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Scott L Wayman

Appeal Filed In District Court

Scott L Wayman

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

Scott L Wayman

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1966 Dated 8/26/2016 for 100.00)

Scott L Wayman

Bond Posted -Cash (Receipt 1967 Dated 8/26/2016 for200.00)

Scott L Wayman

Bond Converted (Transaction number 128 dated 8/26/2016 amount
200.00)

Scott L Wayman

Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel

Scott L Wayman

Plaintiff: Coeur d'Alene Tribe Appearance Jillian H Caires

Scott L Wayman

8/30/2016

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Scott L Wayman

9/7/2016

Objection to Defendant' Motion for Order Extending Stay Enforcement of
Judgment

Scott L Wayman

9/13/2016

Hearing Scheduled (Tentative Hearing-Paperwork not filed 10/07/2016
10:30 AM) Motion for Cont Stay

Scott L Wayman

9/21/2016

Notice Of Hearing

Scott L Wayman

Motion to Appear Telephonically (Semanko)

Scott L Wayman

Order Granting Motion to Appear Telephonic-Norman Semanko

Scott L Wayman

8/29/2016

9/23/2016

208-385-5416
10/6/2016

Dj3fendant's Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Enforcement

Scott L Wayman

i

10/7/2016

Court Minutes
H~aring type: Motion
Hearing date: 10/7/2016
T:ime: 10:54 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Stacy Bradbury
Tape Number:

Scott L Wayman

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 10/07/2016 10:30 AM: Hearing
Held Motion for Cont Stay-Moffit Thomas

Scott L Wayman

Order Staying Enforcement of Judgment Upon Appeal

Scott L Wayman

3
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First Judicial District Court - Benewah County

ROA Report
Case: CV-2016-0000025 Current Judge: Scott L Wayman

Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, etal.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth Johnson, Donna Johnson

Other Claims
Date
10/24/2016

10/31/2016
11/3/2016

Judge
Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal- For Motion for Order of
Scott L Wayman
Recongnition of Foreign Judgment-Hearing Held June 10th, 2016 Reporter
Valerie Nunemacher
Transcript Filed-For Motion for Order of Recongnition of Foreign
Judgment-Hearing Held June 10th, 2016 Reporter Valerie Nunemacher

Scott L Wayman

Transcript Lodged-Byrl Cinnamon

Scott L Wayman

Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal

Scott L Wayman

Certificate Of Mailing- Appeals to the Attorneys

Scott L Wayman

FILE~

201&_101 ~2 rM,2: 14
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

sy: _ _~_·
- - · DEl"tfTY

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No.

CV

:).,D I lR

- Q.::f2.5

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
AS PER I.C. 10-1303

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON ,
Defendant.

STATE OF WASHINGTON
County of Spokane

)
) ss
)

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR., being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
I am over the age of eighteen, not a party hereto and am competent to testify:
1.

I am the attorney for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe with respect to the matter of the

Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth and Donna Johnson.
2.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a tribal

reservation in Benewah and Kootenai Counties in the State of Idaho.
3.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe maintains a tribal court located in Plummer, Idaho.

4.

Judgment Debtors Kenneth and Donna· Johnson are residents of Benewah

County, Idaho, and are owners of real property commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St.
Maries, ID 83861.
5.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe filed suit against defendants in the Coeur d'Alene Tribal

Court on October 8, 2014 by filing a Complaint for Damages and Eviction. Copies of the
Summons and Complaint were mailed to defendants on October 13, 2014 and service of
process of the Summons and Complaint were effected upon defendants on October 30, 2014.

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 1

5

6.

Defendants did not appear in the time provided and an Order of Default was

entered on March 17, 2015 by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe moved
the Tribal Court for entry of a Judgment and the Notice of Hearing and Motion for Entry of
Judgment were mailed to defendants on March 24, 2015. Defendants did not appear and
respond.
7.

On April 1, 2015, the Couer d'Alene Tribal Court entered a Judgment against

defendants in the amount of $17.400 as evidenced by the certified copy of the Judgment
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference hereto. The Tribal Court mailed a copy of
the Judgment to defendants as evidenced by the Clerk's Certificate of Service on the certified
Judgment attached hereto.
8.

The Judgment in Tribal Court remains unsatisfied.

9.

The State of Idaho recognizes Tribal Court Judgments as being entitled to full

faith and credit and recognition in State Court as per Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Id. 1, 655 P.2d
895 (1982).

SUBS-~RiB-ED AND SWORN TO before me this

Jj_ day of January, 2016.

\\'"'"'''''
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AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 2

Lo

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on (date)

//JcJ/J (p

I served a copy to:

Kenneth and Oonna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 838q 1

0) By United States mail

O

0

Sy personal delivery
By fax (number) _ _ _ _ _ __

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 3

7

FILED
Date: '-\,. \, \$"
lime:~·. \loW)

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
EVANS, CRAVEN &LACKIE, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910

Coeurd'Aiene
TribalComt

R?

(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632

----

by:
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D'ALENE

E

OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION

Case No. CV-SC-201 -0260

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

vs.

ORI GINA

KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON,

Defendants.
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing upon

e Motion and
Court find the

application of the Plaintiff for entry of a judgment against Defendant.
following:

1.

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to CTC 44-1.01, et seq.,
and Idaho v. United States and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 62 (2001);

2.

The Court finds Defendant has received notice of this suit, an further finds the
Defendant is in default and an Order of Default has been ente d; and

3.

The Court finds that a judgment should be entered against th Defendant for a
civil penalty in the amount of $ /

/2, 'f Pe>.

e.P, and

~ finding that

the

Defendant is trespassing upon tribally controlled lands, and I tly the Tribe is
entitled to remove the encroachments. ·
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED as follow :

JUDGMENT
Page I

1.

A judgment in the amount of$ /

7, '-/ f?o.
a

,:..f1' as a civil p nalty is entered

against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff;

2.

It is the judgment of this Court that the Defendant has tr spassed against
Plaintiff by maintaining encroachments without proper permits and
, 201

Coeur d'Alene I dian Reservation
State of Idaho, ounty of BenE:wah
I hereby certify his docun:9_nt 1s a t~~e
and correct c y of the ongmal on fl,e
in the office of e Clerk of the Court.
Oate
I- O'i- '=>

-Clerk of Court

~= ~ ~ ~ . . i . . ¥ . . i ~ - -

CLERK.'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the la
of Idaho, that on the _J_ day of Apri (
, 2015, the foregoing was deliv
following persons in manner indicated:
Kenneth & Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

Via Regular Mail
Via Certified Mail
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

Everett B. Coulter, Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201

Via Regular Mail
Via Certified Mail
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632
Hand Delivered

[
[
[
l)ci

JUDGlv.lENT
Page2

.9

F
F1LEID
._~
REHE WAH COUNTY

ZU/6 JAN 2B AH II: I fl
B't:

··t,~

. · -.. ..,.,., ··. -·DEPUTY

_EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632
Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
Case No. CV

COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.

;2 0 Jl_p- OOJ S-

JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S
NOTICE OF FILING OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENT

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON ,
Defendant.

TO: THE JUDGM.ENT DEBTORS/KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON
You are notified that a judgment entered against you in the Tribal Court of the Coeur D'Alene
Tribe of the Coeur D'Alene Indian Reservation, Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260, has been filed in
the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in Benewah County, Idaho, in
Case No. C

VJ

t) J t, -

DO ol ~-

.A

true and correct copy of the Affidavit/Petition

filed in the Benewah County District Court is attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference thereto.

Date:

_;:s~A. . .N__..__......
lA "-~rd--~J'--"-'1_,_1 -""o?-_l)_J_lR_ _

Typed/printed

JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S NOTICE OF FILING FOREIGN JUDGMENT

PAGE 1

CAO CvPi 10-9 4/7/2010

I()

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on (date)

/

/42 U /! lP

Kenneth and Donn<;:1 Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

I served a copy to:

fil

0
D

By United States mail
By personal delivery
By fax (number) _ _ _ _ _ __

CZ uvJ v"'~

~~

Barbara Bergstrom~

JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S NOTICE OF FILING FOREIGN JUDGMENT
CAO CvPi 10-9 4/7/2010

PAGE2
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EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
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818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

SY•

~

.SEf'UfY

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. (!_,U JOt ~ -

c.:::o~

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
AS PER I.C. 10-1303

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON ,
Defendant.

STATE OF WASHINGTON

)

County of Spokane

)

) SS

EVERETT 8. COULTER JR, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
I am over the age of eighteen, not a party hereto and am competent to testify:
1.

I am the attorney for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe with respect to the matter of the

Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth and Donna Johnson.
2.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a tribal

reservation in Benewah and Kootenai Counties in the State of Idaho.
3.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe maintains a tribal court located in Plummer, Idaho.

4.

Judgment Debtors Kenneth and Donna · Johnson are residents of Benewah

County, Idaho, and are owners of real property commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St.
Maries, ID 83861.
5.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe filed suit against defendants in the Coeur d'Alene Tribal

Court on October 8, 2014 by filing a Complaint for Damages and Eviction. Copies of the
Summons and Complaint were mailed to defendants on October 13, 2014 and service of
process of the Summons and Complaint were effected upon defendants on October 30, 2014.

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 1

\~

6.

Defendants did not appear in the time provided and an Order of Default was

entered on March, 17, 2015 by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe moved
the Tribal Court for entry of a Judgment and the Notice of Hearing and Motion for Entry of
Judgment were mailed to defendants on March 24, 2015. Defendants did not appear and
respond.
7.

On April 1, 2015, the Couer d'Alene Tribal Court entered a Judgment against

defendants in the amount of $17,400 as evidenced by the certified copy of the Judgment
attached hereto ;and incorporated herein by reference hereto. The Tribal Court mailed a copy of
the Judgment to defendants as evidenced by the Clerk's Certificate of Service on the certified
Judgment attache(:I hereto.
8.

The Judgment in Tribal Court remains unsatisfied.

9.

The State of Idaho recognizes Tribal Court Judgments as being entitled to full

faith and credit and recognition in State Court as per Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Id. 1, 655 P.2d
895 (1982).
10.

Pursuant to Idaho Code 10-1301, et. seq., the Tribal Court Ju ·gment is entitled

to recognition by the State of Idaho in the Benewah

SUBSC~IBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/?

day of January, 2016.

0w~~
NOTARY PUBUCinandfrthe
State of Washil)9ton 1
Residing at:
';; t 1~
L
My ~ommission xpires: L/.1.r/17

f>
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CERTIFICAT~ OF SERVICE
I certify that on (date) /

/Jv /J lP

I served a copy to:

Kenneth and Oonna Johnson
520 Shepherd Ro~d
St. Maries, ID 838G1

0]

By United States mail
persona, delivery

D ey
D By fax (number) _ _ _ _ _ __

{hJ"" ~ \

Barbara Bergstrom

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
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FILED
Date: \.\-. \, \S:

lime: =3: \lo pro

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; {509) 455-3632

Coeurd'Ateile
Tribal Court

R2

----

by:
· Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D'ALENE

E

OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian ~ribe,

Case No. CV-SC-201 -0260
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORI GINA

KENNEIB AND DONNA JOHNSqN,
Defendants.

TIIIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing upon

e Motion and

application of the Plaintiff for entry of a judgment against Defendant

Court find the

following:
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to CTC 44-1.01, et seq.,
and Idaho v. United States and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 62 (2001);

2.

The Court finds Defendant has received notice of this suit, an further finds the
Defendant is in default and an Order of Default has been ent

3~

; and

The Court finds that ajudgm.ent should be entered against th Defendant for a
civil penalty in the amount of $ /

7., ':/Pe>,

-e_P, and

findmg that the

Defendant is trespassing upon tribally controlled lands, and I

y the Tribe is

entitled to remove the encroachments. ·

NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED as folloW': :

JUDGMENT
Pagel

15

1.

A judgment in the amount of$ /

7-,

'f t:Jo. r:f as a civil

:ty is entered

against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff;

2.

It is the· judgment .of this Court that the Defendant has

n

Plaintiff by maintaining encroachments without proper permits and

R 1~.,.,· I

Coeur d'Alene
State of Idaho,
I hereby certify
and correct c
in the office of

Date

EVERETIB. COULTER,
Attorney for Plaintiff

dian Reservation
ounty of Benewah
his document is a true
y of the original on file
e Clerk of the Court.

,~ 08'- ~

ty:·~~~"""'-":rr::,...,-

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the la s of the state
Apri l •2015, the· foregoing was deliv d to the
following persons in manner indicated:
. ·
of Idaho, that on the _J_ day of

Kenneth & Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

Via Regular Mail
Via Certified Mail
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

Everett B. Coulter, Jr.
Evans, Craven& Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201

Via Regular Mail
[
Via Certified Mail
[
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632 [
Hand Delivered

JUDGMENT
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EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

GY: _ _ _
~ __- ·

or·nu-·

.iuc JY

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. cv-2016-0025
AFFIDAVIT OF EVERETT B. COULTER,
JR., IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR ORDER OF
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT

STATE OF WASHINGTON )
) ss
)
County of Spokane
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR., being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says:
I am over the age of eighteen, not a party hereto and am competent to testify:
1.

I am the attorney for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe with respect to the matter of the

Coeur d'Alene Tribe vs. Kenneth and Donna Johnson.
2.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a tribal

reservation in Benewah and Kootenai Counties in the State of Idaho.
3.

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe maintains a tribal court located in Plummer, Idaho.

4.

Judgment Debtors Kenneth and Donna Johnson are residents of Benewah County,

Idaho, and are owners of real property commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID
83861.
5.

Defendants have never appeared or responded to the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's

Summons and Complaint.
AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 1
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6.

In addition to Defendant's being served a copy of the Summons and Complaint

for Damages and Eviction, I mailed a copy of the same to Defendants Certified, First Class via
the U.S. Postal Service.
7.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of letter I sent to Defendants

prior to filing suit in order resolve this dispute informally.
8.

Attached as Exhibit Bis a true and accurate copy of the Summons and Complaint

for Damages and Eviction filed in the Coeur D'Alene Tribal Court, and Return of Service.
9.

Attached as Exhibit C is a true and accurate copy of the Order of Default entered

by the Court on March 17, 2015, and mailed to Defendants on the same day
10.

Attached as Exhibit D is a true and accurate copy of the Notice of Hearing sent to

Defendants on March 24, 2015.
11.

Attached as Exhibit E is a true and accurate copy of the Judgment entered by the

Coeur d'Alene Tribe on April 1, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

,,,,111111,,,,

,,, ~t-.RIE;:, ,,,,

........

,'- ~
'(/. ~
~~--~isl
ON}!,•••v~ ~
.:, ~ -·~
....,...o.. "41. ,
~,:$I~
~\~~
:"(' !8 NOTARY t\ :x,:
~

- .

.

-

1._ i
~
.:;:::; ...
, ~ · · 0.
1 ··,L-;:
~ '>~··-..'8· 15·\ •••• r~ ~
,,.,,,,
,~ a'F.......
~~-~
WAS'r- ,,,~

~-.

: <1>. \

PUBLIC

,,,,,,. . ,,,,

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
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day of March, 2016.

(11.h,;:)inaLW
~
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the~ day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of
record as follows:

Kenneth and Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

AFFIDAVIT/PETITION FOR RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - page 3
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D

By United States mail
By personal delivery
By fax (number) _ _ __

EXHIBIT A

~Va/J'ld _,

C?l,ca/t;,e//1,-[J/' :Zack w_, ~

67.

Lawyers
Spokane Office
818 W. Riverside
Suite 250, Lincoln Plaza
Spokane, Washington 99201-091 O
(509) 455-5200
FAX (509) 455-3632

Coeur d'Alene Office
1424 E. Sherman Avenue
Eastlake Professional Suites, #300
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 667-8276

· Respond to:

Spokane

H. Terrence Lackie
Gregory M. Kane•
Patrick M. Risken**
Michael E. McFarland, Jr.*
Jon D. Floyd*
James F. Topliff*
Heather C. Yakely*
James B. King
Christopher J. Kerley•
Robert F. Sestero, Jr.*
Sean P. Boutz•
Markus W. Louvier•
Scott A. Flage
Frieda K. Zimmerman
Hugh 0. Evans - of counsel
James S. Craven - of counsel
Everett B. Coulter, Jr.* - of counsel
• also admitted in Idaho
•• also admitted In Idaho & Montana

June 5, 2014
Sent Via Certified Return Receipt and First Class U.S. Mail

Kenneth Johnson

520 Shepherd Rd.
St. Maries, ID 83861

RE:

Encroachment Upon Coeur d'Alene Tribal Submerged Land

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I have been retained to represent the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in respect to several Lake Coeur
d'Alene property owners that have encroachments on Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River.
You have been identified as the owner of property with an encroachment upon tribal submerged
land. That is, the information I have indicates you have a dock or pilings that constitute an
encroachment upon tribal land, and you do not have a tribal permit nor a lease with the Tribe for
continued use of the encroachment.
The Tribe has instructed me to contact you initially by letter and request you either (1) remove
the encroachment, or alternatively (2) obtain a permit and lease with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.
This request for either removal of the encroachment or obtaining the proper permit and lease
requires your action by no later than July 15, 2014.
Should you desire to obtain a permit and lease, please contact the following:
Jason Brown
Recreation Management Program
850 A Street
PO Box 408
Plummer, ID 83851
Phone: (208) 686-1118
E-mail: jbrown@cdatribe-nsn.gov

June 5, 2014
Page 2
This letter shall serve as notice to you under Chapters 34 and 44 of the Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Code.

Lastly, you are notified that if you do not either remove the encroachment or obtain
a permit and lease from the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in the time specified, I have been
i~structed by the Tribe to bring a lawsuit in the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court seeking
an eviction of your encroachment on the tribal land, which includes damages, costs,
and attorney's fees.
Very truly yours,

.

~ ( ) ~ B. L i b ~
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.

EBC/jh
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SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION
• Complete Items 1, 2, and 3, Also complete
item 4 If Restricted Delivery is desired.
• Print your name and address on the reverse
so that we can return the card to you.
• Att, ch this card to the back of the mail piece,
or i n the front if space permits.
1. Artii le Addressed to:

D. Is delivery address different from Item 1?
If YES, enter delivery address below:

3. Service Type
Certified Mall
Registered
CJ Insured Mall

'Ja

<a

CJ Express Mall
CJ Return Receipt for Merchandise
CJ C.O.D.

4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee)
2. Article Number
(Transfer from seN/ce /abe~

PS Form

3811,

February 2004

CJ

Yes

7011 1570 0003 3661 5097
Domestic Return Receipt

102595-02-M;-1$40
' .., .,~·

I}
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EVERETT B. COULTER, .TR.
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.
818 W. Riverside1 Suite250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455~3632
Attorneys for Plaintiff

-E

IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF J'HE COEUR D' ALENE TRIBE
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE lNDlAN RESERVATION

~

1:-Q

,-

=
~

COEUR D'ALENE TRlBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
AND EVICTION

vs.
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON,

Defendants.
COMES NOW the Plaintiff,. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe, a native sovereign entity, by
and through its attorneys, Everett B. Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and
herewith allege the following:

PARTIES
I.
Plaintiff is the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, a federally recognized Indian Tribe and a
sovereign government with a reservation located in Kootenai and Benewah Counties within
the slate ofldaho.

11.
Defendants have an interest in real property abutting the lake Coeur d'Alene waterway,
including Lake Coeur d'Alene and/or the St. Joe River, within the confines of the Coeur
-

d'Alene Tribal Reservation.

COMPLAINT FOR DA.MAG.ES AND EVICTION

Page 1

--

illRlSDICTION & VENUE
III.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (hereinafter the "Tribe") is legally entitled to the
exclusive use and occupancy of the submerged lands and waters within the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation and regulates the use of the submerged lands. See Idaho v. United States and

Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 262 (2001).
IV.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe exercises exclusive sovereignty and dominion over the
submerged lands and waters within the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Coeur d'Alene Tribal
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this case in controversy.

V.
Defendants are the owners or have an interest in real property abutting Lake Coeur
d'Alene waterway, including Lake Coeur d'Alene and/or the St. Joe River, within the Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Reservation.
VI.
Defendants have an encroachment, whether a dock, pier, or piling in or above the
submerged lands of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Reservation.
VII.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe has adopted a tribal code, and specifically the Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Code (hereinafter "CTC") 44-1.01, et seq., addresses encroachment such as the
Defendants' encroachment.
VIII.
Pursuant to CTC 44-24.0l(e), the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over any suit for possession, trespass, or civil penalty resulting from any
violations of Chapter 44 of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Code.

CLAIM FOR CIVIL PENALTY
IX.
Plaintiff repeats· and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates the same
herein by reference thereto.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND EVICTION
Page 2

X.
Defendants have maintained an encroachment in violation of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal
Code.

XI.
Defendants have been provided with notice of the encroachment violation and failed to
obtain a permit from the Coeur d'Alene Tribe to maintain the encroachment.

XII.
Plaintiff is entitled to recover civil damages in an amount to be proven at the time of
trial for Defendants' violation ofCTC 44-24.01, et seq.
XIII.
CLAIM FOR TRESPASS
Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs and incorporates the same
herein by reference thereto.

XIV.
Defendants' continued maintenance of the encroachment in violation of notice
provided to Defendants constitutes a trespass pursuant to CTC 44-24.0l(f).

xv.
As a result of Defendants' trespass, the Plaintiff is entitled to damages.

XVI.
Defendants' trespass should be abated by eviction and removal of the Defendants'
encroachment( s).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:
1) For a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants for damages
as provided by tribal law;
2) For a finding that Defendants' encroachment constitutes a trespass pursuant to
the tribal code;
3) For an order of evictionto abate the trespass permitting the Tribe to remove
Defendants' encroachment(s); and
4) For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND EVICTION
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VERIFICATION
I hereby verify that I have read the above document, understand its contents and that
the statements contained therein are the truth, except for those statements based on
information or belief, which are true to the best of my information or belief.

L---=,,,j~

Jason Brown, Program M ~ger
for the Recreation Management
Program of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

STATE OF

\.Ua~~

County of~
.

.

.l "'-j ~
) ss.

~D

Kci 't\.R__

~

.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

_b_ day of October, 2014.
\

(.····: ~ 4 4 ¢ f 2 r l l ' . l ~

- Notary Public-

State of Washington.
JANICEMARIE R ROE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
.
D.eCe~t:J6, 2016

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND EVICTION
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EVERETTB.COULTER,JR.
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Date~Jf_l{.

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632

lime:l.l:...£Z.L____
Cceu.· c!'A!e~e
Trib;;;l Court

(!)

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE TRIBAL COlJRT OF THE COEUR D' ALENE-TRIBE

0

by·
._.,,_.....,..____

OF THE COEUR D' ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,

SUMMONS

vs.
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF: THE
COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN' 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.
TO: The Above Named Defendants Kenneth and Donna Johnson
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written
response must be filed with the above designated court within 20 days after service of this
Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment against you as
demanded by the plaintiff in the Complaint.
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice
of or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your
written response, if any, may be filod in time and other legal right~ protected.
An appropriate written response requires con1pliance with Tribal Court Rules of Civil

Procedure and other !daho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
1.

SUMMONS
Page 1

The title and number of this case.

Court Clerk

COEUR DALENE TRIBE
PLAINTIFF(S)

-- VS --

COURT:
CASE NO:

COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN
RESERVATION
CV-SC-2014-260

by:
-----

DONNA & KENNETH JOHNSON
PAPER{S) SERVED:

DEFENDANT(S)

COMPLAINT
SUMMONS
I, DAVID C RESSER, SHERIFF OF BENEWAH, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE DELIVERED TO
ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 10TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014.

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014, AT 11 :51 O'CLOCK AM., I, SHERIFF DAVID RESSER,
BEING DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON
*•***KENNETH ALBERT JOHNSON"*•• •
AT THE DWELLING HOUSE OR USUAL PLACE OF ABODE OF SAID PERSON(S), PERSONALLY DELIVERING A TRUE AND
CORRECT COPY THEREOF TO

* • * * * DONNA JOHNSON/SPOUSE * * * * *
A PERSON OVER THE AGE OF 18 YEARSANDARESIDENTTHEREINAT
520 SHEPHERD RD ST MARIES ID 83861
WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH, STATE OF IDAHO.

DATED THIS 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014.
DAVID C RESSER
SHERIFF
SHERIFF'S FEES:

40.00

TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE:
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED:

40.00

0.00

B Y ~ ~
SHE;,;;DA~
SERVING OFFICER

BY
LT SANDRALANXO
RETURNING OFFICER

EVERETT B COULTER, JR.
818 W RIVERSIDE, STE 250
SPOKANE, WA 99201-0910

./

FILE
\.
BENEWAH COUNTY SHERIFF
701 WCOLLEGEAVESTE301
ST MARIES ID 83861

DAVIDCRESSER
(208) 245-2555

·*~ *i~1,~Jl;~#t\ltft .

Date: lt'l(lo/t '1

T

tme: q•.5~~

Paper ID:

2o14oo 733Coeur d'Alene

)t!itiif~ltil\1'111i{~if[1f,I;"
Court Clerk

COEUR DALENE TRIBE
PLAINTIFF(S)

-- VS --

COURT:
CASE NO:

COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN
RESERVATION
CV-SC-2014-260

by:
-----

DONNA & KENNETH JOHNSON
DEFENDANT(S)

PAPER(S) SERVED:
COMPLAINT
SUMMONS

I, DAVID C RESSER, SHERIFF OF BENEWAH, STATE THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS WERE DELIVERED
TO ME FOR SERVICE ON THE 10TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT, ON THE 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014, AT 11:31 O'CLOCK AM., I, SHERIFF DAVID RESSER,
BEING DULY AUTHORIZED, SERVED THE ABOVE DESCRIBED DOCUMENTS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER UPON

* * * * * DONNA LEE JOHNSON * • • * *
PERSONALLY AT:

520 SHEPHERD ROAD ST MARIES ID 83861

WITHIN THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH, STATE OF IDAHO.
DATED THIS 14TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014.
DAVID C RESSER
SHERIFF
SHERIFF'S FEES:
TOTAL COLLECTED TO DATE:
AMOUNT UNCOLLECTED:

40.00
40.00
0.00

BY

~~

SERVING OFFICER

BY
LT SANDRA LANXO
RETURNING OFFICER

EVERETT B COULTER, JR.
818 W RIVERSIDE, STE 250
SPOKANE, WA 99201-0910

EXHIBIT C

FILE
Date: ·3/,:z..[ls
Time: z : c:_e, €½

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKJE, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632

Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Court

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Court Clerk

IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D' ALENE TRIBE by:_ _ __
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
0

w

-,,.~

w

(_)
U.!

c.c

Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260

u-.,

=

e-.,

·Plaintiff,

<.O

ORDER OF DEFAULT

0::::

<J:

::;;;::

VS.

KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

THIS CAUSE coming on regularly for hearing upon the motion of the Plaintiff for an
Order of Default against the Defendants KENNETH ALBERT JOHNSON and DONNA LEE
JOHNSON, and it appearing from the records and files herein that service was made upon the
Defendants as required by law, and the Defendants have not entered their appearance, and the
time for Defendants' Answer has now lapsed, and Defendants have not answered and are
wholly in default, and the Court being fully advised, now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants be and are hereby in
default, and the default of said Defendants is hereby entered, and Plaintiff is hereby allowed to
introduce evidence and move for judgment herein.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this/

7'9 day of March, 2015.
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ORDER OF DEFAULT
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TRIBAL COURT WDGE

Presented by:

By_ _ _-=---___,,~----+--+----EVERETT B. COULTER,
Attorney for Plaintiff

ORDER OF DEFAULT
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11!!:_ day of H-A:lc'CJd
foregoing was delivered to the following persons in manner indicated:

, 2015, the

!Kl.

Kenneth Johnson
Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Rd.
St. Maries, ID 83861

Via Regular Mail
Via Certified Mail
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

Everett B. Coulter, Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 25 0
Spokane, WA 99201

Via Regular Mail
[ ]
Via Certified Mail
[ ]
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632 [ ]
Hand Delivered
kl
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EXHIBIT D

3S

(

ALEO
Date: 3· 3D-lSTime:

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632

4·. tpprn

· Coeurd'Alene

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P,S.

RECE.IVEO

Tribal Co.wt

APR 2 2015

CourtClett

w

----

by:
Attorneys for Plaintiff

::i
.LJ

-u>
)

-~

l,'.""i

c :::)
("J

r---

IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION

C\.'!
Q::

<C

~

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,

Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260

NOTICE OF HEARING
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.
TO: Defendants Kenneth and Donna Johnson
You and each of you will PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, by and through its
attorney Everett B. Coulter, Jr., intend to bring on its Motion for Entry of Judgment for
hearing before the above-entitled Court on the
commencing at

/~

7

day of

~el': \

, 2015

3 : 00 fJn before the Honorable Kenneth Nagy in the Coeur d' Alene Tribal

Court.

~

DATED this

f£_ day of March, 2015.
EVAN

CRAVEN & LA KIE, P.S.

EVERETT B. COULTER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF HEARING
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state
of Washington, that on the)!/._ day of March, 2015, the foregoing was delivered to the
following persons in manner indicated:
Kenneth & Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

Via Regular Mail
Via Certified Mail
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

tr
[ ]
[ ]

NOTICE OF HEARING
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EXHIBIT E

l=n..t:D
Date: 4,. \, \$" .
Time:~·. \loPQJ_

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; (509) 455-3632

Coeur d'Alene
TlibalComt

R?

Court Clerk

---~=

by;
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE TRIBAL COURT OF THE COEUR D' ALENE TRIBE
OF THE COEUR D'ALENE INDIAN RESERVATION

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,

Case No. CV-SC-2014-0260
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORIGINAL

KENNETH AND DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing upon the Motion and
application of the Plaintiff for entry of a judgment against Defendant. The Court find the
following:
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to CTC 44-1.01, et seq.,
and Idaho v. United States and Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 533 U.S. 262 (2001);

2.

The Court finds Defendant has received notice of this suit, and further finds the
Defendant is in default and an Order of Default has been entered; and

3.

The Court finds that a judgment should be entered against the Defendant for a
civil penalty in the amount of $ / ")

/

'f Pe:>.

2._P,

and a finding that the
.

Defendant is trespassing upon tribally controlled lands, and lastly the Tribe is
entitled to remove the encroachments. ·
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED as follows:

JUDGMENT
Page 1
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1.

-Z 'I ~o.

A judgment in the amount of$ /

"

,:.? as a civil penalty is entered

against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff;

2.

It is the judgment of this Court that the Defendant has trespassed against
Plaintiff by maintaining encroachments without proper permits; and

3.

The Tribe is entitled to remove the encroachments.

DONE IN OPEN CQ~~49is /
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EVERETT B. COULTER,
Attorney for Plaintiff

. ISBA# 3768

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state
of Idaho, that on the _J_ day of A.pri t
, 2015, the foregoing was delivered to the
following persons in manner indicated:
Kenneth & Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

Via Regular Mail
Via Certified Mail
Via Facsimile
Hand Delivered

[ ]
IX]
[ ]
[ ]

Everett B. Coulter, Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201

Via Regular Mail
Via Certified Mail
Via Facsimile 509/455-3632
Hand Delivered

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
~]

~ VD

Clerk

JUDGMENT
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DEPUTY

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
)

Case No. CV-2016-0025

COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION FOR ORDER OF
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys, Everett B.
Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and moves the Court for an Order Of Recognition
of Foreign Judgment against the Defendants herein, KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
individually and the marital community composed thereof.
This motion is based upon the files and records herein and the Affidavit of Everett B.
Coulter, Jr. A proposed Order is attached to this Motion.
Dated this

)rvci

day of

(n~

2016.

, JR., #6877
Attorneys for Plaintiff
MOTION FOR ORDER
OF VALID REGISTRATION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT -1

L\ \

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the 1../A. day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of
record as follows:

~ By United States mail

Kenneth and Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

0

D

John Qarper

MOTION FOR ORDER
OF RECOGNITION OF
. FOREIGN JUDGMENT -2

By personal delivery
By fax (number) _ _ __

2u16MAR-7 Jiii/t1·Sl
tJ• f1ti

'ff>-

&y:
--J~---,DEPUTY

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
CODER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. CV-2016-0025
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER OF
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT

COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys, Everett B.
Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and files this Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment against the Defendants herein,
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON, individually and the marital community composed
thereof.
I.
1.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Coeur D'Alene Tribe respectfully requests this Court enter an Order which

recognizes the Judgment from the Tribal Court of the Coeur D'Alene Tribe of the Coeur
D'Alene Indian Reservation as validly registered and enforceable under Idaho State law.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR AN ORDER
OF VALID REGISTRATION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- 1

II.

BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kenneth and Donna Johnson (herein after "Defendants") own riverfront real property,
commonly referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID 83861, on the St. Joe River which has
a dock extending in to the river. Affidavit of Everett B. Coulter. As acknowledged by the United
States Supreme Court in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001 ), the Coeur D'Alene Tribe
(herein after "the Tribe") has exclusive sovereignty over the submerged lands and water within
the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. This enables the Tribe, if they so choose, to charge a permit fee
to those property owners who wish to have a dock. By way of a letter dated June 5, 2014, the
Tribe informed Defendants of the permit requirement and instructed the Defendants on how to
obtain the same. Affid. of Coulter, Ex. A. This letter was sent Certified Mail by the U.S. Postal
Service. Id. Defendants received this letter on June 6, 2014, as is evidenced by the signature of
defendant Donna Jonson on the Return Receipt. Id. This letter satisfied any notice requirements
found in Chapters 34 and 44 of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Code (herein after "CTC). Despite the
Tribe's best efforts, Defendants refused to obtain the proper permit for their encroaching dock.
Having been unsuccessful in resolving the dispute informally, the Tribe filed suit in the
Tribal Court of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe (herein after "Tribal Court") against Defendants for
damages and to evict their encroaching dock on October 8, 2014. Affid of Coulter, Ex. B. The
Johnsons were served on October 14, 2014, with a copy of the Summons and Complaint but did
not appear or answer. Affid. of Coulter. The Tribe entered an Order of Default on March 17,
2015, and was mailed to Defendants on the same day. On March 24, 2015, Defendants were sent
notice that the Tribe was seeking a default judgment in accordance with Coeur d'Alene Tribal
Rules of Civil Procedure 53(a)(2) . Affid. of Coulter, Ex. D. Defendants still did not appear or
respond. On April 1, 2015, the Tribal Court entered a default judgment against the Johnsons
which imposed a civil penalty in the amount of $17,400 and permitted the Tribe to remove the
trespassing dock. Affid. of Coulter, Ex. E.
The amount sought by the Tribe in the default judgment proceedings underscores the
good will of the Tribe in dealing with Defendant's encroachment. Under the Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Code, Defendants were subject to a civil penalty of up to $500 per day for each day the
encroachment was maintained. CTC 44-24.0l(C)(l). However, the Tribe only sought a $100 per

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR AN ORDER
OF VAUD REGISTRATION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- 2

day penalty for 174 days even though the encroachment has been present for a much larger time.

Affid. ofCoulter, Ex. F. 1
On January 22, 2016, the Tribe filed Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of Foreign

Judgment As Per JC. 10-1303, Case No. CV-2016-0025, with this Court. Attached to the
Affidavit/Petition was a certified copy of the Tribal Judgment. In addition, the Tribe filed a

Clerk's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment on January 22, 2016. The Tribe also mailed to
Defendants a Judgment Creditor's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment on January 26, 2016.
These procedures were in accordance with LC. § 10-1303 which governs the procedures for
filing foreign judgments in Idaho.
To date, Defendants, as Judgment Debtors, have not responded to the Tribe's Filing of
Foreign Judgment. Idaho's statutory five day period which judgment creditors must wait prior to
seeking execution or other process for enforcement of the foreign judgment has expired. The
Tribe now seeks an order from the court which validates and recognizes the Tribal judgment in
order to begin enforcement efforts.

III.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Idaho Gives Judgments of Tribal Courts Full Faith and Credit.

Idaho gives full faith and credit to tribal court judgments pursuant to Article 4, Section 1
of the U.S. Constitution. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895 (1982) ("Tribal
court decrees, while not precisely equivalent to decrees of the courts of sister states, are
nevertheless entitled to full faith and credit."). In order to implement the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1738 which states, in pertinent part:
Such ... judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
In Sheppard, the court held the phrase "Territory or Possession" to be "broad enough to
include Indian tribes, at least as they are presently constituted under the laws of the United
States." Sheppard, l 04 Idaho at 8. The court explained, "We believe that this holding will
facilitate better relations between the courts of this state and the various tribal courts within
Idaho." Id at 8.
1

This is the number of days between the filing of the Complaint and entry of judgment.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR AN ORDER
OF V AUD REGISTRATION
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- 3

L\5

Under the Full Faith and Credit clause, Idaho courts presume a final judgment entered by
a competent court is valid. Sheppard, l 04 Idaho at 7. In other words, a "party asserting the
invalidity of the judgment must carry the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the
presumption" of validity. Id. at 7; Clear v. Marin, 86 Idaho 87, 92,383 P.2d 346,349 (1963).
B.

The Coeur D'Alene Tribe Has Jurisdiction Over Defendants' Encroachment.

As noted above, a "party asserting the invalidity of the judgment must carry the burden of
proof sufficient to overcome the presumption" that the final judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit. Sheppard l 04 Idaho at 7. Defendants have not appeared at any point in this matter and
have not argued the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their encroaching dock.
However, even if they did assert such an argument, Defendants will not be able overcome the
presumption that the Tribal Court Judgment is valid.
The property at issue is owned by Defendants and located at what is commonly referred
to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID 83861. This property sits on the bank of, and has a dock
which extends in to, the St. Joe River. Title to the land underlying this portion of the St. Joe
River is held in trust by the federal government for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. Idaho v. United
States, 533 U.S. at 265. 2 The Tribe has "exclusive sovereignty and dominion over the submerged

lands and waters within the area now known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." CTC 44-1.01.
Therefore, the Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over Defendants' encroachment and any
suit for possession, trespass, or civil penalty resulting from violation of Chapter 44 of the Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Code. CTC 44-24.0l(e).
C.

Defendants Were Afforded Procedural Due Process Under Idaho and Tribal
Law and Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendants were properly given ample notice and an opportunity to be heard in Tribal
Court. The procedural due process "requirement is met when the defendant is provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard." Neighbors for a healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145
Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126 (2007). "Procedural due process requires some process to ensure
that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal
constitutions." Id. at 127.
2

"The question is whether the National government holds title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to lands
underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. We hold that it does." Idaho, 533 U.S. at 265.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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In Idaho, a party who has not entered a notice of appearance is not entitled to receive
notice of an application for default judgment. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d
81 (2009); see also, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). However, the Tribe's Rules of Civil
Procedure contain an extra procedural safeguard above and beyond Idaho law by requiring the
non-appearing party to receive notice of the default judgment. See, Coeur d'Alene Tribal Rules
of Civil Procedure 53(a)(2). The Tribe complied with this requirement. Affid. of Coulter, Ex. C.
Idaho law "imposes an obligation on defendants to seek counsel and does not permit
willful ignorance of the proceedings." Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288. A defendant's due process
rights are not violated when he receives "initial service of process and also a mailed notice of the
Entry of Default but" does nothing. Id. at 288.
Although not raised by Defendants since they have not appeared, Defendants received
more than adequate due process under Idaho law. Defendants received service of the Summons
and Complaint for Damages and Eviction on October 14, 2014. Affid. Coulter, Ex. B. In addition
to being served, a copy of the Summons and Complaint for Damages and Eviction was addressed
to Defendants and mail Certified, First Class with the U.S. Postal Service on October 9, 2014.
Affid. Coulter. Having not appeared or responded to the Tribe's Complaint, on March 17, 2015,
the Tribal Court entered an Order of Default against Defendants, a copy of which was mail to
Defendants by the Clerk's Office. Affid. Coulter, Ex. D. In Idaho, the purpose of the court clerk
sending notice of an Order of Default to a defendant "is to inform defendants of the judgment
against them so they can either promptly satisfy the judgment to avoid post-judgment interest or
file a motion to resist the judgment." Meyers, 148 Idaho at 292. Defendants still did not appear.
Affid. Coulter. On March 18th, 2015, the Tribe sent a Notice of Hearing to Defendants alerting
them of the Tribe's intention to bring its Motion for Entry of Judgment. Affid. Coulter, Ex. D.
Defendants still did not appear and the Tribal Court entered a Judgment against Defendants on
April 1, 2015. Ajjid. Coulter, Ex. E. Defendants were mailed a copy of the Judgment via
Certified mail on the day it was entered. Affid. Coulter, Ex. E. Still, Defendants have not
responded or appeared. Affid. Coulter.
Nor can Defendants argue lack of jurisdiction. First, Defendants should not be permitted
to now, after notice of all the proceedings and every opportunity to be heard, make this
argument. See, Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288 (Idaho law does not permit defendants to be willfully
ignorant of the legal issues). If Defendants believe the Tribe did not have jurisdiction then they
MEMORANDUM rN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR AN ORDER
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OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT- 5
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could and should have raised this issue in Tribal Court. Second, there is no doubt the Tribe has
exclusive jurisdiction over encroachments on Tribal land. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 265; CTC 44-1.01
and 44-8.01. Therefore, the Tribal Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the Tribe's legal action.
As is evident, Defendants received adequate due process because they were given notice
of the various proceedings and were afforded many opportunities to be heard. In addition, the
Tribal Court had jurisdiction over the controversy.

IV.

CONCLUSION

There is no evidence before the Court that the Tribe's entry of final judgment was not
valid. Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this Court grant its Motion for an Oder of Valid
Registration of Foreign Judgment.

Dated this..?~ day of

fnO'LCA., ,2016.

VEN & LACKIE, P.S.

-~
EVERETT B. COULTER, JR., #6877
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the~ day of March, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of
record as follows:

@

Kenneth and Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861

D
D

John~er
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By United States mail
By personal delivery
By fax (number) _ _ __
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BY:
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EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
8 I 8 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632
Attorneys.for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
VS.

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Case No. CV-2016-0025
MOTION FOR ORDER OF
DISQUALJFICIATION AND
ASSIGNMENT OF NEW JUDGE
PURSUANT TO J.R.C.P. 40(D)(l)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys, Everett B.
Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and moves the Court for an Order Of
Disqualification and Assignment of New Judge. This motion is based upon Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 40(d)(l) and that Plaintiff does not believe it can receive a fair and impartial
proceeding before the Honorable Judge Payne based on his prior work as a prosecutor.

Dated this ~day of

&vcb.

, 2016.

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.

By

~,/4-# '{~lb

EERE B.

COULTER, JR., #6877
Attorneys for Plaintiff
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
AND ASSIGNMENT OF NEW

JVDGE -1

,Of?UT'r

ti y:_ ___.7Pt=..__
_ _ _ , DEPUJ1

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally

Case No. CV-2016-0025

recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.

[Proposed]

ORDER OF DISQUALIFJCIATION

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

THIS CAUSE coming on regularly for hearing upon the motion of the Plaintiff
for an Order of Disqualification, and it appearing from the records and files herein and
the Court being fully advised, now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Honorable Judge Douglas
Payne is hereby disqualified from acting further in this matter.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

i

--!+---

day of March, 2016.

ORDER DISQUALIFICATION
Page 1
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Presented by:
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.

By:_+---,-~-"---Jl-

~ <-(l b

Everret . oul er, #3768
Attorney for Defendants
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
8 I 8 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 455-5200
(509) 455-3632 facsimile

ORDER DISQUALIFICATION
Page2

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the

JL day of March, 2016, I caused to be served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
all counsel of record as follows:

Kenneth and Donna Johnson
520 Shepherd Road
St. Maries, ID 83861
Everett B. Coulter, Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste 250
Spokane, WA 99201

ORDER DISQUALIFICATION
Page 3

E(

D
D

By United States mail
By personal delivery
By fax (number) _ _ __

~By United States mail
By personal delivery
By fax (number) _ _ __

D
D

F'ofl.ED

BENF~'AH COUNTY

a:

~1

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS:filU(J'rn 11 AH
Ii
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B'J!'Nt:ffltil
·
MAGISTRATE DMSION
~ . .
gy;__________ ,OEPUJJ

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
Recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)

KENNETII and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV16-25
ORDER ASSIGNING MAGISTRATE
ON DISQUALIFICATION

WHEREAS the Honorable Douglas Paul Payne, being disqualified from proceeding
further in the above-entitled action:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the HONORABLE DANIEL J. MCGEE, Magistrate
of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, is hereby assigned to take jurisdiction of the

above entitled-action for all further proceedings herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of Benewah County
shall cause a copy of this Order Assigning Magistrate to be mailed to counsel for each of the

parties, or, if either of the parties are represented pro se, directly to the pro se litigant.
DATED this

lo\4' day of March, 2016.
Karlene Behringer,
Trial Court Administrator

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this _J_I day of March,
2016 to:

Benewah County Case File - Original
The Honorable Daniel J. McGee
700 Bank Street
Wallace, Idaho 83873
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 455-5200
(509) 455-3632 Fax
Defendants

Deputy Clerk
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Norman M. Semanko, ISB No. 4761
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

-

12 20

-b l°fl ' :

,DE:PUT'r

&

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
nms@moffatt.com
26575.0000
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

CODER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,

Case No. CV-2016-0025
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER
OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

Client:4149493.1
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COME NOW the Defendants in the above case, KENNETH and DONNA
JOHNSON, by and through their attorney, Norman M. Semanko of Moffatt Thomas, and file this
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Order ofRecognition ofForeign Judgment.
For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiffs motion should be denied.

I.

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

The government of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe ("Tribe") has asserted jurisdiction
and control over a dock owned by the Johnsons, which is located on the St. Joe River. Upon
their refusal to submit to the Tribe's demands for payment of $100 per year for the dock, going
back to 2003, the tribal government has sought, and the tribal court has imposed, a civil penalty
in the amount of$17,400. The Tribal Courtjudgment also orders the removal of the Johnsons'
dock.
Having no authority or jurisdiction to enforce its own penal judgment against the
Defendants, the government of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe now seeks to have this Court recognize
the judgment, thereby giving the tribal government an additional avenue to seek enforcement
against the Johnsons.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Tribal Court Judgment Cannot Be Recognized Under Idaho Code
Section 10-1301 et seq.
The Tribe claims that its judgment "is entitled to recognition by the State of Idaho

in the Benewah County District Court ... Pursuant to Idaho Code 10-1301 et seq."
Affidavit/Petition for Recognition ofForeign Judgment as Per LC 10-1303, 110 (Jan. 19, 2016).
However, Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq. only applies to a "foreign
judgment," which is defined as "any judgment, decree or order ... regarding the support of a
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child, spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity." IDAHO CODE§ 10-1301
(emphasis added). It is only this type of judgment "which is entitled to full faith and credit in
this state" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq. Id
The Judgment issued by the Tribal Court pertains to alleged trespass upon tribally
controlled lands, requested removal of an encroachment, and imposition of a civil penalty against
the Johnsons. It is not a "foreign judgment," as that term is defined in Idaho Code Section
10-1301, and therefore cannot be recognized by this Court.

B.

Principles of Comity Preclude Recognition of the Tribal Court Judgment.
The Tribe relies upon Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1992),

for the notion that tribal court judgments are "entitled to full faith and credit and recognition in
State Court." Affidavit/Petition for Recognition ofForeign Judgment as Per IC. 10-1303, ,r 9;

Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Order ofRecognition ofForeign Judgment,
pp. 3-4 (Mar. 2, 2016).
As discussed above, the Tribe's argument is based upon a faulty reading ofidaho
Code Section 10-1301 et seq., and the request to recognize the tribal judgment should be rejected
on that ground. The act simply does not apply to the type of judgment now before the Court. In
addition, the matter in Sheppard was "one of family law," involving a tribal court decree of
adoption. Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 19,655 P.2d at 913. It is oflimited applicability. Moreover,
the court's determination that the tribal judgment should be given full faith and credit was based
upon federal court interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which have since been supplanted. That
statute, passed by the U.S. Congress, states in pertinent part: "Such ... judicial proceedings ...
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories
and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
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from which they are taken." Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 7,655 P.2d at 901. The question is whether
Indian tribes are covered by this provision.
In Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit
explained that the full faith and credit clause "applies only to the states." Wilson, 127 F.3d at
808. The Ninth Circuit explained that the Constitution does not afford full faith and credit to
Indian tribal court judgments. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808. The Ninth Circuit also held that
Congress did not extend full faith and credit to tribal court judgments in the implementing statute
found at 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The Ninth Circuit's decision is contrary to the earlier conclusion by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard. However, interpretation of the federal statute is of course
a matter of federal law.
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit further explained that in the absence of a
Congressional extension of full faith and credit, the recognition and enforcement of tribal
judgments must inevitably rest on principles of comity. Wilson, 127 F .3d at 809. The Ninth
Circuit then relied on two authorities for its comity analysis: (1) Section 482 of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States; and (2) Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895).
The Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]hile Hilton and the Restatement (Third) provide
sound guidance for assessing legal judgments of other nations, special considerations arising out
of existing Indian law merit some modification in the application of comity to tribal judgments."

Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit then laid out the following legal
criteria:
In synthesizing the traditional elements of comity with the special
requirements oflndian law, we conclude that, as a general
principle, federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal
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judgments. However, federal courts must neither recognize nor
enforce tribal judgments if:
the tribal court did not have both personal and
( 1)
subject matter jurisdiction; or
(2)

the defendant was not afforded due process of law.

In addition, a federal court may, in its discretion, decline to
recognize and enforce a tribal judgment on equitable grounds,
including the following circumstances:
(1)

the judgment was obtained by fraud;

(2)
the judgment conflicts with another final judgment
that is entitled to recognition;
(3)
the judgment is inconsistent with the parties'
contractual choice of forum; or
(4)
recognition of the judgment, or the cause of action
upon which it is based, is against the public policy of the United
States or the forum state in which recognition of the judgment is
sought.

Wilson, 127 F.3d at 810. The Ninth Circuit revised the factors in Section 482 of the Restatement
(Third) so that subject matter jurisdiction was a mandatory, rather than discretionary, factor for
the review of tribal court judgments. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811.
1.

The tribal court lacks the required jurisdiction for recognition of its
judgment in state court.

Both Sheppard and Wilson prohibit the recognition of a tribal judgment when the
tribal court does not have jurisdiction, both over the person and the subject matter.
A primary problem for the tribal court judgment in this matter is the tribal court's
general lack of jurisdiction over non-tribal members, such as the Johnsons.
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In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., Inc., 554 U.S.
316 (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court explained why it has been reluctant to subject non-tribal
members to tribal jurisdiction:
Tribal sovereignty, it should be remembered, is "a sovereignty
outside the basic structure of the Constitution." The Bill of Rights
does not apply to Indian tribes. Indian courts "differ from
traditional American courts in a number of significant respects."
And non-members have no part in tribal government-they have
no say in the laws and regulations that govern tribal territory.
Consequently, those laws and regulations may be fairly imposed
on nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented, either
expressly or by his actions. Even then, the regulation must stem
from the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on
entry, preserve tribal self-.government, or control internal
relations.
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This statement in the majority opinion in Plains Commerce was taken from the
concurring opinion of Justice Souter in Nevada v. Hicks:
The ability of nonmembers to know where tribal
jurisdiction begins and ends, it should be stressed, is a matter of
real, practical consequence given "[t]he special nature of [Indian]
tribunals," Dura v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990), which differ
from traditional American courts in a number of significant
respects. To start with the most obvious one, it has been
understood for more than a century that the Bill ofRights and the
Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian
tribes. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-385 (1896);
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 664-665 (1982 ed.)
(hereinafter Cohen) ("Indian tribes are not states of the union
within the meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional
limitations on states do not apply to tribes").
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383-84 (emphasis added). Justice Souter also explained:
Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) makes a
handful of analogous safeguards enforceable in tribal courts, 25
U.S.C. § 1302, "the guarantees are not identical," Oliphant, 435
U.S., at 194, and there is a "definite trend by tribal courts" toward
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the view that they "ha[ve] leeway in interpreting" the ICRA's due
process and equal protection clauses and "need not follow the U.S.
Supreme Court precedents 'jot-for-jot,"' Newton, Tribal Court
Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22
Am. Indian L. Rev. 285, 344, n. 238 (1998). In any event, a
presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction squares with one
of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant, namely,
an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members
be "protected . .. from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty," 435 U.S., at 210.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added). Justice Souter also listed other concerns with nontribal members being subjected to tribal courts:
Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often
from one another) in their structure, in the substantive law they
apply, and in the independence of their judges. Although some
modem tribal courts "mirror American courts" and "are guided by
written codes, rules, procedures, and guidelines," tribal law is still
frequently unwritten, being based instead "on the values, mores,
and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions, and
practices," and is often "handed down orally or by example from
one generation to another." .... The resulting law applicable in
tribal courts is a complex "mix of tribal codes and federal, state,
and traditional law," . .. which would be unusually difficult for
an outsider to sort out.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85 (emphasis added). Finally, Justice Souter expressed concern that
tribal courts are often subordinate to the political branch:
The result, of course, is a risk of substantial disuniformity in the
interpretation of state and federal law, a risk underscored by the
fact that "{t/ribal courts are often 'subordinate to the political
branches of tribal governments,'" Dura, supra, at 693 (quoting
Cohen 334-335).
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
While Plains Commerce relied on the concurring opinion of Justice Souter in
Hicks for this language regarding the limits of tribal courts, Justice Souter in Hicks relied on
Dura v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), which is discussed more fully below. In turn, the majority
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opinion in Duro relied on the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Merrion v. Jicarilla

Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 172-73 (1982), where Justice Stevens wrote:
The tribes' authority to enact legislation affecting
nonmembers is therefore of a different character than their broad
power to control internal tribal affairs. This difference is
consistent with the fundamental principle that (i[n this Nation
each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed."
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,426. Since nonmembers are
excluded from participation in tribal government, the powers that
may be exercised over them are appropriately limited.

Merrion, 455 U.S. at 172-173 (emphasis added).
Tribal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, because a tribe's adjudicative
jurisdiction is only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367
(2001). And this tribal jurisdiction is limited to what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359. Any "[t]ribal assertion of
regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to that right of the Indians to make
their own laws and be governed by them." Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Supreme Court
established that Indian tribes do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish nonIndians. This was explained further in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), which held that
Indian tribes may not assert criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian. See also United

States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (there was no constitutional impediment to Congress
providing tribes inherent authority to prosecute criminal misdemeanors). The Supreme Court
explained why criminal punishment is not granted to Indian tribes:
Criminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on
personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a
power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to
the overriding sovereignty of the United States.
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Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. The Supreme Court explained the limitations of the tribal courts:
The special nature of the tribunals at issue makes afocus on
consent and the protections of citizenship most appropriate.
While modem tribal courts include many familiar features of the
judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs,
languages, and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are
often "subordinate to the political branches oftribal
governments," and their legal methods may depend on "unspoken
practices and norms." It is significant that the Bill of Rights does
not apply to Indian tribal governments. The Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure,
but these guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional
counterparts.

Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Because of these limitations, the
Supreme Court questioned whether Congress could subject American citizens to tribunals that do
not provide constitutional protections as a matter of right:
Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of
Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings
before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional protections as
a matter of right.

Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. The lack of constitutional protection from tribal power was a reason the
Supreme Court declined to allow tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers of
their tribe:
This is all the more reason to reject an extension of tribal authority
over those who have not given the consent of the governed that
provides a fundamental basis for power within our constitutional
system.

Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
The same reasons that the Supreme Court has declined to extend criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers of a tribe should also compel this Court to decline to extend penal
jurisdiction over nonmembers of a tribe by enforcing a judgment that arises from civil penalties.
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Subject matter jurisdiction is also lacking in this matter.
The Tribe claims an interest in land underlying the St. Joe River, held in trust by
the United States pursuant to Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). The Tribe asserts that
the land underlying the portion of the St. Joe River over which the Johnsons' dock extends "is
held in trust by the federal government for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe." Memorandum in Support

ofPlaintiff's Motion for Order ofRecognition ofForeign Judgment at 4. The Tribe claims
"exclusive sovereignty and dominion over the submerged lands and waters within the area now
known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." Id. (quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribal Code 44-1.01). It
is clear from these statements, and the enforcement actions taken, that the tribal government
asserts broad authority over all submerged lands and the waters overlying them, within the
entirety of the current exterior boundaries of the reservation.
In doing so, the Tribe fails to note that the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals specifically recognized that the United States reserved, or set aside, the
submerged lands that existed prior to Statehood in 1890. See generally, Idaho v. United States,
533 U.S. 262 (2001) and United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding
finding that the United States reserved 1873 submerged lands for the Tribe). It is these
submerged lands within the reservation-and only these submerged lands-that are owned by
the United States. It is well known that additional lands within the reservation boundary became
submerged only after the construction of Post Falls Dam in 1907. See, e.g., In re Sanders Beach,
143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006); Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208,970 P.2d 1 (1998);

Deffenbaugh v. Washington Water Power Co., 24 Idaho 514, 135 P. 247 (1913); Petajaniemi v.
Washington Water Power Co., 22 Idaho 20, 124 P. 783 (1912); Washington Water Power Co. v.
Waters, 19 Idaho 595, 115 P. 682 (1911).
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While the ordinary high water mark (OHWM) is currently 2128 feet and has been
at that level since 1907 (Erickson, 132 Idaho at 211, 970 P.2d at 4), this higher level is the result
of"the dam [that] raised the water level. . .in both the lake and in the Coeur d'Alene and St. Joe
rivers that feed into the lake." The dam has been recognized as "raising the elevation of the
water ... approximately 6 1/2 feet .... This increased height in the dam naturally resulted in
submerging the lands adjacent to Coeur d'Alene Lake and the streams flowing into the lake to an
elevation of at least 2,126.5 feet." In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (emphasis
added); see also, Deffenbaugh, 24 Idaho at 520-21, 135 P.2d at 253-54 ("the elevation is raised
six or eight feet above the ordinary elevation of the water in the summer and fall").
It is these additional submerged lands-at least 6 1/2 feet and perhaps as much as

8 feet-beyond those recognized in Idaho v. United States, that the Tribe asserts ownership over
in the tribal code. This is the basis for the Tribe's asserted jurisdiction over the Johnson's,
whose land is immediately adjacent to the artificially elevated portion of the St. Joe River. There
is no basis for this ownership or the asserted jurisdiction over the J ohnsons. The United States
only reserved those submerged lands that existed prior to Statehood. They did not--could notreserve lands that would not become submerged until after the dam was built in 1907. Indeed,
Washington Water Power Co. compensated private landowners for flooding caused by the dam
on these lands. Obviously, these lands were not owned by the United States. Simply because the
tribal government asserts ownership and control over these additional submerged lands does not
grant them that right.
The extent of the submerged lands controlled by the Tribe is the subject of current
litigation in the Coeur d'Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication ("CSRBA"), where the Coeur
.d'Alene Tribe has filed multiple objections to individual water right claims along the St. Joe
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River, claiming that the individuals' water diversion structures are encroaching upon the Tribe's
submerged lands. In order to prove trespass, the Tribe will of course first need to establish
ownership of the submerged lands in question. As in the instant matter, this ownership cannot be
presumed, particularly where the submerged lands were not submerged until well after statehood.

In Re CSRBA, Case No. 49576 (pending in the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho)
(CSRBA subcase litigation information available at www.srba.state.id.us/CSRBA1 .HTM).

2.

The Defendants were not afforded due process.

Both Sheppard and Wilson require that due process be afforded to the defendants.
Otherwise, the tribal judgment cannot be recognized by the court.
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that due process is a fundamental requirement for
the enforcement of tribal court judgments:
The guarantees of due process are vital to our system of
democracy. We demand that foreign nations afford United States
citizens due process of law before recognizing foreign judgments;
we must ask no less of Native American tribes.

Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit also explained its concept of due
process, writing:
Due process, as that term is employed in comity, encompasses
most of the Hilton factors, namely that there has been opportunity
for a full and fair trial before an impartial tribunal that conducts
the trial upon regular proceedings after proper service or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and that there is no showing of
preiudice in the tribal court or in the system of governing laws.
Further, as the Restatement (Third) noted, evidence "that the
iudiciary was dominated by the political branches ofgovernment
or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was unable to obtain
counsel, to secure documents or attendance of witnesses, or to have
access to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the
legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to
recognition." Restatement (Third) Section 482 cmt. b.
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Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added).
In addition to these criteria, the Ninth Circuit also explained that the enforcement
of tribal court judgments should be based on federal law, rather than on state laws:
We apply federal common law when a federal rule of decision is
"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests." Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 (1964). Indian law is
uniquely federal in nature, having been drawn from the
Constitution, treaties, legislation, and an "intricate web of
judicially made Indian law." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191,206 (1978). State law, especially the compacts
between a state and a tribe, may be of substantial significance in a
particular case. However, the quintessentially federal character of
Native American law, coupled with the imperative of consistency
in federal recognition of tribal court judgments, by necessity
require that the ultimate decision governing the recognition and
enforcement of a tribal judgment by the United States be founded
on federal law.
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 813 (emphasis added).
Of course, in this matter the tribal court is dominated by the tribal government,
which is the plaintiff seeking the judgment in the tribal court. The tribal government is
particularly biased on questions of ownership regarding submerged lands, as reflected in the
tribal cod~. In addition, it has not hesitated to impose a large civil penalty of $500 per day.
Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to see how the Johnsons were afforded due
process.
C.

Recognition of the Tribal Court Judgment Is Prohibited by the Penal Law
Rule.
The penal law rule is a "venerable and widely-recognized" rule that a state or

country does not enforce the penal judgments of other states or countries, unless required to do
so by treaty. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme et L 'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,
1218 (9th Cir. 2006). A penal law is one where the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to
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the public, rather than to an individual. In other words, a penal law is where the law punishes an
offense against the government, rather than provide a private remedy to a person injured by the
wrongful act. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1219. In this case, the judgment against the Johnsons is
issued in favor of the tribal government.
The penal law rule is a part of the general principles of comity followed by the
Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997). While comity allows
the enforcement of judgments compensating private individuals for injuries or harm, comity does
not allow the enforcement of judgments in favor of a government for harms to the public.
The penal law rule was first established by the United States Supreme Court in

The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), when Chief Justice John Marshall
explained that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 23
U.S. at 123; United States v. Federative Republic ofBrazil, 748 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2014).
Since Chief Justice Marshall's decision in The Antelope, the Supreme Court has
continued to treat the penal judgment rule as an "incontrovertible maxim" over many years. In

Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888), overruled in part on other
grounds by Milwaukee County v. ME. White Co., 296 U.S. 268,278 (1935), the Supreme Court
stated:

By the law of England and of the United States, the penal laws of
a country do not reach beyond its own territory, except when
extended by express treaty or statute to offences committed abroad
by its own citizens; and they must be administered in its own
courts only, and cannot be enforced by the courts of another
country.
127 U.S. at 289-90 (emphasis added).
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In the case of Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the Supreme Court ruled
that Maryland was required to enforce a judgment from New York that imposed liability on a
defendant to a plaintiff for money because of the defendant's false certificate misstating the
capital stock of a company. The Supreme Court again referred to the words of Chief Justice
Marshall that "[t]he courts ofno country execute the penal laws of another." 146 U.S. at 666.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the penal law rule did not apply in that case, because the
judgment was to compensate a private individual for actual losses, rather than to punish the
defendant for an offense against the state. 146 U.S. at 667.
In the case of Oklahoma ex rel. West v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co.,
220 U.S. 290, 299 (1911), the Supreme Court decided that it did not have power to enforce the
penal statutes of the State of Oklahoma. The Supreme Court relied on its 1888 decision in
Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., which stated "[t]he rule that the courts of no country

execute the penal laws of another ...." Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 290; Oklahoma, 220 U.S. at 299.
The Supreme Court wrote:
Those principles must, in our opinion, determine the present case
adversely to the State. Although the State does not ask for
judgment against the defendant railroad company for the penalties
prescribed by the Oklahoma statutes for violations of its
provisions, she yet seeks the aid of this court to enforce a statute
one of whose controlling objects is to impose punishment in order
to effectuate a public policy touching a particular subject relating
to the public welfare. The statute viewed as a whole is to be
deemed a penal statute. The present suit, although in form one of
a civil nature, is, in its essential character, one to enforce by
injunction regulations prescribed by a State for violations of one
of its penal statutes and is, therefore, one of which this court
cannot take original cognizance at the instance of the State.
220 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
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In the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,413 (1964),
the Supreme Court ruled that the act of state doctrine prevented a remedy for Cuba's
expropriation of sugar in Cuba. The Supreme Court again recognized "the principle enunciated
in federal and state cases that a court need not give effect to the penal or revenue laws of foreign
countries or sister states." 376 U.S. at 413-14.
In Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 360-61 (2005), the Supreme Court
held that a conspiracy to violate the United States' wire fraud statute as part of an attempt to
evade Canadian liquor import laws was not subject to the penal law rule, because the statute at
issue was a United States statute. In that case, the Supreme Court again quoted Chief Justice
Marshall's statement that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." 544
U.S. at 361. The Supreme Court explained that "[t]he rule against the enforcement of foreign
penal statutes, in turn, tracked the common-law principle that crimes could only be prosecuted in
the country in which they were committed." 544 U.S. at 361.
The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed and explained this history, in United
States v. Federative Republic ofBrazil, 748 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2014). In that case, the Second
Circuit held that a judgment of a Brazilian court forfeiting proceeds of crime to the Brazilian
government would not be enforced by the United States courts, because the judgment was a
penal judgment for purposes of the penal law rule. Brazil could enforce its foreign judgment
only through a statutory procedure established through the United States Attorney General. 28
U.S.C. § 2467. In Federative Republic, the Second Circuit wrote that Judge Learned Hand had
explained the rationale for the penal law rule, by pointing to the danger in requiring United
States courts to "pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state," something that
"is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court." Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604
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(2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring), off on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930). The Second
Circuit had explained that enforcement of foreign criminal laws would enmesh the courts in "the
relations between the states themselves," a matter outside judicial competence and, in any event,
"intrusted to other authorities" under the United States' system of separation of powers. Moore,
30 F.2d at 604; Federative Republic, 748 F.3d at 92; Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 109-20 (2d Cir. 2001) (expounding uponjustifications for
revenue rule, including "respect for sovereignty, concern for judicial role and competence, and
separation of powers").
Section 483 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States provides as follows:
Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to
enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties
rendered by the courts of other states.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 483 (1987).
The comment to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law defines what constitutes a
penal law as follows:
A penal judgment, for purposes of this section, is a judgment in
favor of a foreign state or one of its subdivisions, and primarily
punitive rather than compensatory in character. A iudgment for a
fine or penalty is within this section; a judgment in favor of a
foreign state arising out of a contract, a tort, a loan guaranty, or
similar civil controversy is not penal for purposes of this section.
Nor is a judgment for damages rendered in an action combining
claims of civil and criminal responsibility, as is possible in some
states, for example in respect of vehicle accidents or nonsupport of
dependents. Actions may be penal in character, however, and
therefore governed by this section, even if they do not result from
judicial process, for example when a government agency is
authorized to impose fines or penalties for violation o{its
regulations.
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LA w OF THE UNITED SrATES § 483 cmt. b
(1987) (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit relied on the penal law rule in Section 483 of the Restatement
in its en bane decision in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme Et L 'Antisemitisme, 433
F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006):
California courts follow the generally observed rule that, "'[u]nless
required to do so by treaty, no state [i.e., country] enforces the
penal judgments of other states [i.e., countries]."' In re Manuel P.,
215 Cal.App.3d 48, 81,263 Cal.Rptr. 447 (1989) (Wiener, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Restatement§ 483 cmt. 3); see also In re
Marriage o/Gray, 204 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1253, 251 Cal.Rptr. 846
(1988). This is consistent with the Restatement's declaration that
"fc/ourts in the United States are not required ... to enforce
iudgments (from foreign countries/ for the collection of . .. fines
or other penalties." Restatement§ 483; see also 30 Am.Jur.2d
Execution and Enforcement of Judgments § 846 (2004) ("Courts in
the United States will not recognize or enforce a penal judgment
rendered in another nation."). A number of states have adopted an
identical version of California's Uniform Act, see Enforcing
Foreign Judgments in the United States and United States
Judgments Abroad 28-32 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992), and the
common law rule against the enforcement ofpenal judgments is
venerable and widely-recognized. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657, 673-74, 13 S.Ct. 224, 36 L.Ed. 1123 (1892); see also 18
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 130.05
(2002).

Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit again quoted Section 483
later in its opinion:
In short, the label "civil" does not strip a remedy of its penal
nature. Thus, for example, an American court is not required to
enforce an order of contempt or an award of punitive damages in a
civil action. Cf Frankv. Reese, 594 S.W.2d 119, 121
(Tex.Civ.App. 1979) ("Other jurisdictions are reluctant to give full
faith and credit to an order for contempt due to its punitive
nature[.]"); Republic ofPhilippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
821 F.Supp. 292,295 (D.N.J. 1993) (refusing to enforce Philippine
law providing for punitive damages); see also Third Restatement
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.§ 483 cmt. b ("Some states consider judgments penal for purposes
of nomecognition if multiple, punitive, or exemplary damages are
awarded1 even when no govermnental agency is a party.").

Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1219-20.
The 2005 Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act revised
the 1962 act of the same name. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (July 21, 2005) ("Uniform Law").
These acts codify the most prevalent common law rules with respect to the recognition of money
judgments rendered in other countries. Uniform Law, at 1. This Uniform Law provides the
means to enforce the judgments of a govermnent, except for the United States or its possessions,
and except for any other govermnent that is subject to the Full Faith and Credit clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Uniform Law, § 2.
However, this Uniform Law does not allow for the enforcement of penal
judgments. Instead, the law states:
(b)
This [act] does not apply to a foreign-country
judgment, even if the judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum
of money, to the extent that the judgment is:
(1)

a judgment for taxes;

(2)

a fine or other penaltv ....

Uniform Law, § 3 ( emphasis added). The National Conference explained this rule as follows:

Foreign-country iudgments for taxes and iudgments that
constitute fines or penalties traditionally have not been
recognized and enforced in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Restatement
Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §483
(1986). Both the "revenue rule," under which the courts of one
country will not enforce the revenue laws of another country, and
the prohibition on enforcement of penal judgments seem to be
grounded in the idea that one country does not enforce the public
laws of another. See id. Reporters' Note 2. The exclusion of tax
judgments and judgments constituting fines or penalties from the
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scope of the Act reflects this tradition. Under Section 11, however,
courts remain free to consider whether such judgments should be
recognized and enforced under comity or other principles.
Uniform Law, at 7 (emphasis added). The National Conference also explained:
Courts generally hold that the test for whether a judgment is a fine
or penalty is determined by whether its purpose is remedial in
nature, with its benefits accruing to private individuals, or it is
penal in nature, punishing an offense against public justice.
Uniform Law, at 7.
The 2005 Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act has been
adopted by Idaho, as Idaho Code Section 10-1401 et seq. Idaho Code Section 10-1403 provides
as follows:
(2)
This chapter does not apply to a foreign country
judgment, even if the judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum
of money, to the extent that the judgment is:
(a)

A judgment for taxes;

(b)

A fine or other penalty;

IDAHO CODE § 10-1403(2).
In Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970), the Supreme Court recognized that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister states enforce a foreign penal judgment:
Since the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that
sister States enforce a foreign penal judgment, Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); cf Milwaukee County v. ME. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268,279 (1935), California is free to consider what
effect, if any, it will give to the North Carolina detainer in terms of
George's present "custody."

Nelson, 399 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).
In the case of City of Oakland v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 267 P.3d 48
(Nev. 2011), the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether it was required to enforce a
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California civil judgment against a sign company for violation of a section of the City of
Oakland's municipal code dealing with signage. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that
Nevada was not required to enforce a California judgment that was penal in nature:

In addition, the United States Supreme Court has determined that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to penal
judgments. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666, 672-73
(1892); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224,229 (1970) (reiterating
that "the full faith and credit clause does not require that sister
states enforce a foreign penal judgment").
City of Oakland, 267 P.3d 48 (emphasis added). As a result, Nevada did not enforce California's
judgment.
Other states follow this approach, holding that the Full Faith and Credit clause
does not require the enforcement of a sister state's penal judgment. Philadelphia v. Austin, 429
A.2d 568,572 (N.J. 1981) ("the United States Supreme Court has continued to recognize the
vitality of the penal exception," but does require enforcement of the tax and revenue judgments
of sister states); Schaefer v. H B. Green Transp. Line, 232 F.2d 415,418 (7th Cir. 1956) ("It is
generally recognized that penalties fixed by state laws are not enforc[e]able in federal courts or
even in other State courts."); People v. Laino, 32 Cal. 4th 878, 888, 87 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2004)
("[W]e have stated that the full faith and credit clause 'does not require that sister States enforce
a foreign penal judgment.'") ("If California need not give full faith and credit to penal judgments
of another state, then it is free to determine under its own laws whether defendant's Arizona plea
constitutes a conviction for purposes of the three strikes law"); Farmers & Merchants Trust Co.

v. Madeira, 261 Cal. App. 2d 503,508, 68 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188 (Ct. App. 1968) ("If the judgment
is a penal judgment it is not enforceable in this state under either the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution or as a matter of comity.") ("It is the prevailing rule throughout

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT - 20

Client:4149493.1

77

this country that no action can be maintained in one state to recover money extracted as
punishment for a civil wrong committed under the laws of another state."); SH v. Adm 'r of

Golden Valley Health Ctr., 386 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (while not deciding the
merits of the case, recognizing that the "full faith and credit clause ... does not require a state to
enforce the penal judgment of another state"); MGM Desert Inn, Inc. v. Holz, 411 S.E.2d 399,
402 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) ("One exception to the full faith and credit rule is a penal judgment; a
state need not enforce the penal judgment of another state."); Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43, 46
(Tex. App. 2003) (recognizing that penal judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit as
they are among the recognized exceptions to the full faith and credit requirements).
The scope of the penal law rule covers remedies that go to the public, rather than
to private individuals. In Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., the Supreme Court wrote that the
penal law rule applied to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for
any violation of municipal laws. 127 U.S. at 290. The Supreme Court explained:
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes
and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor ofthe State for lite
recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for
tlte protection o(its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all
iudgments for suclt penalties. If this were not so, all that would
be necessary to give ubiquitous effect to a penal law would be to
put tjle claim for a penalty into the shape of a judgment.

Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that a judgment of the
state of Wisconsin for a penalty against a Louisiana insurance company for failure to properly
register was not enforceable by the federal courts. The Supreme Court explained:
The cause of action was not any private injury, but solely the
offence committed against the State by violating her law. The
prosecution was in tlte name oftlte State, and tlte whole penaltv.
when recovered, would accrue to the State, and be paid, one half
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into her treasury, and the other half to her insurance commissioner,
who pays all expenses of prosecuting for and collecting such
forfeitures.

Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court went on to explain:
The real nature of the case is not affected by the forms provided by
the law of the State for the punishment of the offence. It is
immaterial whether, by the law of Wisconsin, the prosecution must
be by indictment or by action; or whether, under that law, a
judgment there obtained for the penalty might be enforced by
execution, by scirefacias, or by a new suit. In whatever form the
State pursues her right to punish the offence against her
sovereignty, every step of the proceeding tends to one end, the
compelling the offender to pay a pecuniary fine by way of
punishment/or the offence.

Wisconsin, 127 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
In Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the Supreme Court explained the
distinction between penal laws and laws that compensate individuals for damages. 146 U.S. at
668. The Supreme Court explained:

Crimes and offences against the laws of any State can only be
defined, prosecuted and pardoned by the sovereign authoritv of
that State; and the authorities, legislative, executive or judicial, of
other States take no action with regard to them, except by way of
extradition to surrender offenders to the State whose laws they
have violated, and whose peace they have broken.

Huntington, 146 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also explained:
The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is
whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the
public, or a wrong to the individual, according to the familiar
classification of Blackstone: "Wrongs are divisible into two sorts
or species: private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an
infringement or privation ofthe private or civil rights belonging
to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon
frequently termed civil injuries: the latter are a breach and
violation ofpublic rights and duties, which affect the whole
communitv, considered as a communitv; and are distinguished by
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the harsher appellation of crimes and misdemeanors." 3 Bl. Com.
2.

Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668-69 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also gave the following
distinction:
The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects
may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so
that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends
upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence
against the public iustice ofthe State, or to afford a private
remedy to a person iniured by the wrongful act.

Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673-74 (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit explained that penal judgments are those intended to punish an
offense against the public justice of the foreign state. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Cantre Le Racisme

Et L 'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane). The test to determine the
penal nature of a judgment
is not by what name the statute [on which the judgment is based] is
called by the legislature or the courts of the State in which it was
passed, but whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon
to enforce it to be, in its essential character and effect, a
punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil
right to a private person.

Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1219 (emphasis added); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 413 n.15 (a penal law for purposes of the penal law rule "is one which seeks to
redress a public rather than a private wrong").
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that the law for the enforcement of tribal judgments is
the law of comity applied to judgments issued by foreign countries. Wilson v. Marchington, 127
F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997). The application of the penal law rule is consistent with the
Supreme Court's limitation of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers to "consensual relationships."
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Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. The majority opinion wrote that the term '"other arrangement' is
clearly another private consensual relationship, from which the official actions at issue in this
case are far removed." 533 U.S. at 359 n.3. Justice O'Conner disagreed with the breadth of this
statement, and the majority opinion responded as follows:
The concurrence exaggerates and distorts the consequences of our
conclusion, that the term "other arrangements" in a passage from
Montana referred to other "private consensual" arrangements - so
that it did not include the state officials' obtaining of tribal
warrants in the present case. That conclusion is correct, as a fuller
exposition of the passage from Montana makes clear:
"To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over nonIndians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements."
450 U.S., at 565.
The Court (this is an opinion, bear in mind, not a statute) obviously
did not have in mind States or state officers acting in their
governmental capacity; it was referring to private individuals who
voluntarily submitted themselves to tribal regulatory jurisdiction
by"the arrangements that they (or their employers) entered into.
533 U.S. at 371-72 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This distinction between voluntary or consensual relationships is similar to the
distinction in the penal law rule between fines and penalties and contractual relationships for
purposes of the penal law rule of Section 483:
A judgment for a fine or penalty is within this section; a judgment
in favor of a foreign state arising out of a contract, a tort, a loan
guaranty, or similar civil controversy is not penal for purposes of
this section.
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(1987).
In this way, the penal law rule is consistent with Montana's first exception, both
of which preclude jurisdiction where the claim of jurisdiction is based on tribal government
compulsion of nonmember conduct. Similarly, both allow jurisdiction if the person has
voluntarily entered into a contractual relationship with the government.
Based on these rules, it seems clear that the judgment at issue in this case is based
on a penal law, or a law that punishes an offense against the public or the Tribe as a whole. As a
result, it should not be recognized by this Court.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants respectfully request that the tribal
government's motion be denied.
DATED this 6th day of May, 2016.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

,J----- ""\,- ~~
Norman M. Semanko - ~ e Firm
Attorneys for Defendants
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO nFNF W:A. 8
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
701 WEST COLLEGE A VENUE, SUITE 203
2016 HAY 13
ST. MARIES, IDAHO 83861

Coeur d'Alene Tribe
vs.

Kenneth Johnson, etal.

)
)
)
)
)

r0UNTY

8¥:a

Case No: CV-2016-0000025
ORDER REASSIGNMENT OF JUDGE

Based upon the Judgment Exceeding $10,000 in this case.It is Hereby Ordered that the above
~ssigned case previously appointed to Honorable Daniel McGee is hereby now appointed to
Honorable Scott Wayman in the District Court of Benewah County.

Copies to:
Everett B Coulter
Norman M Semanko

,DEPUl:S

Case #CV2016-0025 Gut-\ Tribe v Johnson - Mtn re Foreign Jdn ..

Time

Speaker

3B-COURTROOM1

Note

8:52:40 AM jJudge Wayman Parties Present: Everett Coulter, Atty for Plaintiff; Norman
iClerk Batson
Semanko, Atty for Defendants; Kenneth & Donna Johnson,

.......................................... .1. ....................................................Defendants.........................................................................

b!. C\. . . Q.L Affill\6n .............................

9:31 :58 AM l
Judge Calls Court
9:33: 15 AM •Judge Wayman This case was Orginally assigned to Judge Payne and
Reassigned to Judge McGee. I had lunch with Judge McGee
yesterday and he had a funeral to go to so I was happy to cover
1his case. I have reviewed the file. There is a Judgment in the
!amount of over 17,000 and should have been assigned to the
District Court. So I have signed an Order assigning to District
lCourt. Idaho rule of Civil Procedure you may disqualify new
Judge within 7 days of the Order of reassignment. It appears to
me the Plaintiff has already exercised the right, but the Johnson
do have the right. If you would like more time to exercise the
Disqualification I will vacate this hearing and reschedule this
case. Another option is to agree to allow me to hear the case
land waive the right to the Disqualification and we can go forward
!today. We could also continue this hearing till later today so you
jean talk to your clients. This happens sometimes and I want to
!make sure everyone rights are protected. I want to make sure
lyou are comfortable with me serving as your Judge.

!

9:39:43 AM iMr Coultre
!

jThe Johnson Reply Memorandum I did not get it till Tueday. We
!would like an oppurtunity to reply and address under federal
lindain law. I would like till next friday to file response and breif

j

~

l

9:40:44 AM lMr Semenko

l
l
l
l

lvou presiding will not be an issue with us. We had it over
\nighted to arrive on Friday. I am here an awful lot so I have no
/problem being here for hearing. I would like 60 seconds to refer
)o my clients on the diqualification. My Clients have no desire to
ldiqualify you under idaho rule.

I

I

9:42:58 AM Mr Coultre
1

t

9:44: 11 AM Mr Semenko

!
'

9:44:58 AM Judge

The issues in the brief we do not need oral arguement. Would
/like it set down the road.
iwe have no problem we would like oral agruement. I think this
!will need 1/2 hour and fine with rescheduling or proceeding
!today.
1I hate continuiing things. I will vacate today hearing and
\reschedule till another day you will have 14 days to file you
response. Reset for June 10th at 11 :00

..............................·············r···········............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

9:46:57 AM !Judge
9:47:29 AM Judge

5/13/2016

Mr & Ms Johnson hopfully I can give you a decision June 10th
jEnd
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EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
VS.

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

I.

Case No. CV-2016-0025
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER
OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The underlying case is about the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's ("the Tribe") ability to
exclude structures from encroaching on tribal land. The Tribal Court entered a default
judgment against the Johnsons after they failed to appear in the case and refused to either
pay a fee or remove their encroachment prior to the Tribe bringing suit. To be clear, the
Tribal Court judgment has two parts. The first part is an order which directs the removal.
of the encroaching dock. The second part is a civil penalty in the amount of $17,400.
The matter currently pending before this Court is the Tribe's Motion for an Order
which recognizes the validity of the Tribal Court judgment in order that the Tribe may
enforce the judgment rendered in Tribal Court. The Johnsons, who only just recently
appeared in this matter, oppose the Tribe's currently pending motion.
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION Page 1

Idaho law holds, as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, a judgment by a tribal
court is entitled to Full Faith and Credit under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the U.S.
Constitution. Sheppard v. Sheppard, l 04 Idaho 1, 7-8 (1982)("Tribal court decrees, while
not precisely equivalent to decrees of the courts of sister state, are nevertheless entitled to
full faith and credit" and "More recently the Supreme Court has indicated, citing Cox
with approval, that full faith and credit analysis is appropriately applied to tribal courts.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 n.21 (1978)).

In Idaho, "A final judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
presumed valid and therefore the party asserting the invalidity of the judgment must carry
the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the presumption." Sheppard, l 04 Idaho at 7.
Since the Johnsons oppose the judgment of the Tribal Court they bear the burden to
overcome the presumption of validity. Just as in Sheppard where the objecting party was
not able to provide sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of validity and the
Court recognized the tribal judgment, the Johnsons have not presented any evidence
overcoming the presumption that the Tribal judgment in this case is valid. Rather than
relying on any evidence, the J ohnsons rely on bare assertion.
The Johnsons object to the validity of the tribal court judgment on the following
ground: 1) I.C. § 10-1301 is not applicable; 2) the Tribal Court lacked personal and
subject matter jurisdiction as required by comity; 3) insufficient due process; and 4)
recognition of the judgment is barred by the Penal Law Rule.
As set forth below: 1) the Johnsons simply misread I.C. § 10-1301; 2) the Tribe
does have personal and subject matter jurisdiction because the Tribe has the power to
exclude encroachments from Tribal land, 3) the Johnsons received more due process than
required under Idaho law; and 4) there is no legal authority suggesting the Penal Law
Rule is applicable to Tribal judgments.

It is important and significant to note the Johnsons have not presented any
evidence to the Court substantiating any of their factual claims. Absent any evidence, the
Johnsons simply cannot overcome a presumption of validity. See, Sheppard, 104 Idaho at

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION Page 2

8-9 ("Absent such evidence, he has failed to carry his burden of proving that the tribal
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.")
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Johnsons Misstates The Plain Language Of Idaho Code§ 10-1301
The Johnsons argues Idaho Code § 10-1301 applies only to orders "regarding the

support of a child, spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity."

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 1-2. The Johnsons have significantly
misread this statute. In full, Idaho Code§ 10-1301 states:

In this act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order of a
court of the United States or of any other court or an order of an
administrative body of any state regarding the support of a child, spouse,
or former spouse or the establishment of paternity which is entitled to full
faith and credit in this state.
I. C. § 10-1301 (emphasis added). By its plain language, this statute is a definition and list
of items which qualify as foreign judgments. Each item on the list is separated by the
word 'or.' I.C. § 10-1301. The term 'or' "should ordinarily be given its normal
disjunctive meaning .... " Filer Mt. Telephone Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 76
Idaho 256, 261, 281 P.2d 478 (1995). "The word 'or' is defined as a function word to
indicate (1) an alternative between different or unlike things, states, or actions ... ; (2) [a]
choice between alternative things, states, or courses .... " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993)." State v. Rivera, 131 Idaho 8, 11, 951 P.2d
528 (Ct. App. 1998).
Although the statute had two parts the Johnsons interpretation of Section 10-1301
eliminates the first portion of the statute which states '"foreign judgment' means any
judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court .... "
(Emphasis added). The second portion of Section 10-1301 goes on to include certain
family law orders by stating " . . . or an order of an administrative body of any state
regarding the support of a child, spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of
paternity which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state." (Emphasis added).
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Clearly, the Johnsons have misread Section 10-1301 and their request to deny the
Tribe's pending Motion on this basis should be denied.
B.

Idaho Recognizes the Judgments of Tribal Courts Through The Full Faith
and Credit Clause
Defendants ask this Court to overrule the Idaho Supreme Court by evaluating

whether to recognize a judgment from the Tribal Court under the principles of comity
rather than the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 2. Further, the Johnsons appear to argue Sheppard only
applies to family law cases. Although Sheppard was a case involving family law issues,
the Johnsons' cite in support of the argument that Sheppard is limited only to matters of
family law does not reveal any language in the text which appears to support the same.
Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard engaged in a comprehensive analysis of
authorities supporting a full faith and credit analysis and authorities supporting a comity
analysis. The Sheppard court concluded, "Tribal court decrees, while not precisely
equivalent to decrees of the sister states, are nevertheless entitled to full faith and credit."
Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895 (1982). In so holding, the Idaho Supreme Court
cited the United States Supreme Court case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,
65-66 n. 21 (1978) and United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How. 100, 15 L.Ed. 299
(1856).
Even if this Court were to consider recognizing the Tribal Court Judgment under
the principals of comity the Judgment should be recognized. "As a general principle,
Federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal judgments" so long as the tribal court
has "both personal and subject matter jurisdiction" and "the defendant ... was afforded
due process of law." Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997). As set
forth below, the Tribal Court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction and the
Johnsons were afforded more than adequate due process.
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Still, the law of Idaho is that Idaho courts are to determine whether to recognize a
tribal judgments through the framework of full faith and credit. Therefore, this Court
should decline the Defendant's invitation to change Idaho law.
C.

Coeur D'Alene Tribe Has Jurisdiction Over Land Within Its Boundaries
The Johnsons next argue that the Tribal Court lacked personal and subject matter

jurisdiction. However the "Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65.
There is no dispute in the federal courts that a tribe's civil authority includes the authority
to exclude from its land. See, e.g., Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v.

LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808 (9 th Cir. 201l)("In considering the extent of a tribe's civil
authority over non-Indians on tribal land, we first acknowledge the long-standing rule
that Indian tribes possess inherent sovereign powers, including the authority to
exclude."); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983)("A tribe's
power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is
... well established.").
The Tribe has engaged in this litigation to rectify the issue of the Johnsons'
encroaching dock since October 14, 2014. Prior to this litigation, the Tribe unsuccessfully
attempted to settle their dispute with the Johnsons. Once settlement efforts failed the
Johnsons received service of process of the Summons and Complaint. The Johnsons did
not appear but continued to receive notice of each action in Tribal Court. The Johnsons
now challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court after appearing for the first time after
nearly nineteen months of litigation. Since tribes have the jurisdiction over the lands,
which includes the power to exclude from their land, the Tribe has jurisdiction in this
matter.
a. Johnsons were required to exhaust jurisdictional objections in Tribal
Court of Coeur D'Alene Tribe
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The United States Supreme Court has held litigants in tribal court are required to
challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal court in tribal court. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("[T]he federal policy supporting tribal self-government
directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a full opportunity
to determine its own jurisdiction ... unconditional access to the federal forum would
place it in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's
authority over reservation affairs.").
The Supreme Court cases of Iowa Mutual Insurance Company ("Iowa Mutual")
and National Farmers Union Insurance Companies ("National Farmers Union") is
controlling in this case. Both Iowa Mutual and National Farmers Uniion involved civil
defendants who did not challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal court in tribal court. Iowa
Mutual, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Instead the
defendants in both cases waited to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal court in federal
court. In National Farmers the Supreme Court declined to address the issue of personal
jurisdiction until the issue was first resolved by the tribal court. National Farmers, 471
U.S. at 857 ("Until petitioners have exhausted the remedies available to them in the
Tribal Court system ... it would be premature for a federal court to consider any
relief.") In Iowa Mutual, the Court reaffirmed National Farmers by holding,
[T]he exhaustion rule announced in National Farmers Union
applies here as well. Regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, the
federal policy supporting · tribal self-government directs a
federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a
"full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.

***

As National Farmers Union indicates, proper respect for tribal
legal institutions requires that they be give a "full opportunity"
to consider the issues before them and "to rectify any errors."
471 U.S., at 857, 105 S.Ct., at 2454. The federal policy of
promoting
tribal
self-government
encompasses
the
development of the entire tribal court system, including
appellate courts. At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies
means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to
review the determinations of the lower tribal courts .... Until
appellate review is complete, the Blackfeet Tribal Courts have
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not had a full opportunity to evaluate the claim and federal
courts should not intervene.
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 16-17. Just as in National Farmers Union, the Court in
Iowa Mutual declined to answer the issue of jurisdiction and reversed the lower court's
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The recent Ninth Circuit case Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v. 'Sa'
Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2013), further explained the requirement that a
litigant exhaust tribal remedies before challenging the jurisdiction of the tribe in other
courts. 715 F.3d at 1200. In Skywalk the plaintiff, Skywalk, was a nonmember limited
liability corporation in a contractual relationship with the Hualapai tribe. In the course of
their business relationship the tribe utilized eminent domain to acquire Skywalk' s
interest in the contract through tribal court. Skywalk responded by seeking injunctive
relief and challenging the tribe's jurisdiction in federal district court. Id. at 1199-1200.
The Skywalk court declined to consider Skywalks jurisdictional challenge by
explaining "Federal law has long recognized ... deference to the tribal court as the
appropriate court of first impression to determine its jurisdiction." Id. at 1200. The court
further explained its understanding of National Farmers "as determining that tribal court
exhaustion is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather a prerequisite to a federal court's
exercise of its jurisdiction. Therefore, under National Farmers, the federal courts should
not even make a ruling on tribal court jurisdiction

. . . until tribal remedies are

exhausted." Id. at 1200.
Although this Court is obviously a court of Idaho and not a federal court, the
same policy considerations which are present in federal court apply equally to state
court. See, e.g., Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8 ("We believe that this holding [recognizing a
tribal judgment] will facilitate better relations between the courts of this state and the
various tribal courts within Idaho.") Since the Johnsons have not challenged, let alone
exhausted, the issue of jurisdiction in Tribal Court this Court should decline to examine
the issue.
b. The Tribe Has Personal Jurisdiction Over The Johnsons
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Tribal courts have jurisdiction to regulate the encroachments of non-members on
tribal land because it has the power to exclude non-members from their land. See, Water
Wheel, 642 F.3d at 808 ("[W]e first acknowledge the long-standing rule that Indian tribes
possess inherent sovereign powers, including the authority to exclude.").
The Johnsons incorrectly argue the Tribe did not have personal jurisdiction over
them. Further, the Johnsons' brief fails to provide any real and substantive analysis on
the issue of jurisdiction that incorporates the facts of the case and the law. Instead, the
Johnsons generally state, "A primary problem for the tribal court judgment in this matter
is the tribal court's general lack of jurisdiction over non-tribal members, such as the
Johnsons." Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 4. Forgetting for a moment that
this is an inaccurate statement of the law, the J ohnsons then provide four pages of quotes
and citations to various United States Supreme Court cases. Unfortunately the Johnsons
do not apply the cited law to the facts of the current case and therefore do not provide
any real legal analysis regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction. The Johnsons'
invitation for this court to rule on the issue of personal jurisdiction in a civil case based
on Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), highlights a lack of
understanding regarding the developed case law regarding personal jurisdiction in tribal
courts over non-tribal members for conduct occurring on tribal land in civil actions.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in National Farmers explained why Oliphant does not apply
to civil cases. See, e.g., National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854-55; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at
15 ("although the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal courts is subject to substantial federal
limitations, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe ... their civil jurisdiction is not
similarly restricted. If state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands
would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are
generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law.")

In Iowa Mutual the Court did not rule on the issue of jurisdiction but explained,
"Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important
part of tribal sovereignty." 480 U.S. at 18. The Ninth Circuit recognized this rule when it
stated, "From a tribe's inherent sovereign powers flows lesser powers, including the
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power to regulate non-Indians on tribal land." Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area,
Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2011). In so holding the Ninth Circuit
relied on the United State Supreme Court case South Dakota v. Bourland which held "a
tribe's power to exclude includes the incidental power to regulate." Water Wheel, 642
F.3d at 809 (relying on Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689). In another case, the Supreme Court
stated "A tribe's power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on
the reservation is ... well established." New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324,333 (1983).
The case law on this issue makes clear that before determining whether a tribe has
personal jurisdiction over a defendant certain factual determinations must be made: the
identity of the defendant and the factual circumstances under which the alleged injury
occurred. For example, the answer to the issue of personal jurisdiction is different
depending on whether the alleged injury occurs on tribal land as compared to non-Indian
fee land. In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the narrow issue was "the
tribe's ability to exercise its power to exclude only as applied to the regulation of nonIndians on non-Indian land, not on tribal land." Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 810 (emphasis
added). As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Water Wheel, the Supreme Court case
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-145 (1982), decided one year after
Montana v. United States and without applying the Montana analysis, held a tribe has
"inherent authority to exclude non-Indians from tribal land." 642 F.3d at 810. The Ninth
Circuit has stated "as a general rule, both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have
recognized that Montana does not affect this fundamental principle as it relates to
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian land." Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 812.
In the present case, the Johnsons' are non-Indians but own a dock which
encroaches in to the waterway of and rests on the submerged land of the Coeur D'Alene
Tribal Reservation. Thus, the case involves the activity of non-Indians on Tribal land. In
this circumstance, as noted above, the whole weight of federal Indian law holds,
Tribal authority over activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the
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tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute.

Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
The present case is similar to Water Wheel. In Water Wheel the lawsuit was "an
action to evict non-Indians who have violated their conditions of entry and trespassed on
tribal land." 642 F.3d at 812, n. 7. There the Ninth Circuit held personal jurisdiction for
trespass existed and explained the trespass "directly implicat[ed] the tribe's sovereign
interest in managing its own lands. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 334-35." 642
F.3d at 812, n. 7. In the present case, the Johnsons have not obtained permission to
maintain an encroachment on tribal land and have violated the conditions which the Tribe
places on entry and encroachments to the same. Therefore, there can be no doubt the
Tribal Court had personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the Johnsons encroaching and
trespassing dock.

c. The Tribe Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Encroachments On Tribal
Land
In addition to personal jurisdiction, a tribal court must have subject matter
jurisdiction. Here, the tribe has subject matter jurisdiction because the controversy
involves conduct (the encroachment) occurring on Tribal land. In addition, just as is the
case regarding personal jurisdiction, the Johnsons are required to exhaust their subject
matter jurisdiction arguments to the Tribal Court prior to raising them here.
The Johnsons dispute the Tribe has subject matter jurisdiction based on an
argument that the submerged lands existing at the time of statehood has increased by
approximately 6.5 feet due to a dam. The Johnsons further assert that their dock is located
within this "additional" 6.5 feet of submerged land. The problem with the Johnsons'
argument and factual assertions is that they have submitted no evidence to rebut the
finding of the Tribe that the dock encroaches on Tribal land.
The property at issue is owned by the Johnsons and located at what is commonly
referred to as 520 Shepherd Rd., St. Maries, ID 83861. This property sits on the bank of,
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and has a dock which extends in to, the St. Joe River. Title to the land underlying this
portion of the St. Joe River is held in trust by the federal government for the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 265. 1 The Tribe has "exclusive
sovereignty and dominion over the submerged lands and waters within the area now
known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." CTC 44-1.01. Therefore, the Tribal Court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the Johnsons' encroachment and any suit for possession,
trespass, or civil penalty resulting from violation of Chapter 44 of the Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Code. CTC 44-24.01 (e). The Johnsons' bare assertions to the contrary are
unsupported by any evidence in the record.
Despite having full notice of the proceedings against them, the Johnsons chose
not to appear to challenge any portion of the Tribe's claims. The Johnsons now argue the
Tribe's ownership "cannot be presumed." The Johnsons had notice and a full opportunity
to contest the issue of whether their dock encroached on tribal land and thus had subject
matter jurisdiction. They chose not to. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d
81 (2009) ("Idaho law imposes an obligation on defendants to seek counsel and does not
permit willful ignorance of the proceedings."). The Tribe respectfully requests this Court
not permit the Johnsons to be willfully ignorant and ignore the Tribal Court proceedings
for over a year-and-a-half, despite notice of the proceedings, and now challenge the result
because they do not like the outcome. The Johnsons should have exhausted their
jurisdictional challenges in tribal court and should not now be permitted to challenge the
merits of the case or jurisdiction here.
d. The Tribe Has Given Defend ants More Due Process Than Idaho Law
Entitles Litigants.

The Johnsons argue they did not receive the minimum amount of due process
necessary for the Tribal Court judgment to be recognized in Idaho.

Defendants'

Memorandum in Opposition, p. 12. The procedural due process "requirement is met when

1

"The question is whether the National government holds title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to
lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. We hold that it does." Idaho, 533
U.S. at 265.
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the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." Neighbors for a

Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126 (2007).
The J ohnsons makes vague and unsupported accusations that the trial court is "of
course ... dominated" by tribal government, biased "as reflected in the tribal code," and
that the Tribe "has not hesitated to impose a large civil penalty of $500 per day."

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, p. 12. The Johnsons offer absolutely no
evidence to support these conclusory allegations and bare assertions. Further, the
Johnsons' brief completely fails to recognize any of the notice of proceedings they
received from the Tribe even though they did not appear. The Tribe fully identified the
notice and due process given to the non-appearing Defendants in the Tribes previously
filed Memorandum in Support of Motion For an Order of Valid Registration of Foreign

Judgment at page 2-3. For the sake of brevity the Tribe will only list the notice and due
process the Defendants have received:
•
•
•
•
•

Served with Summons and Complaint on October 14, 2014
Copy of Order of Default on March 17, 2015
Notice of Hearing for Motion of Entry of Judgment on March 24, 2015
Clerk's Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment on January 26, 2016
Notice of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Order of Recognition of
Foreign Judgment mailed and all supporting papers on March 4, 2016

The Johnsons in this case received a copy of the Summons and Complaint and
therefore received "notice and an opportunity to be heard." See Neighbors for a Healthy

Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 127 (The procedural due process "requirement is met when the
defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard."). As previously
mentioned by the Tribe, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not entitle defendants who
have not appeared in a lawsuit to receive notice of an application for default judgment.

Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,288,221 P.3d 81 (2009); see also, Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(b)(2). However, the Tribe's Rules of Civil Procedure contain the extra
procedural safeguard which is above and beyond Idaho law by requiring the nonappearing party to receive notice of the default judgment. See, Coeur d'Alene Tribal
Rules of Civil Procedure 53(a)(2). The Tribe complied with the notice requirement found
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in the Tribal Code which resulted in the Tribe providing the Johnsons with four more
"layers" of due process than they would have been entitled to in the courts of Idaho. See,
e.g., Meyers, 148 Idaho at 288 ("initial service of process and also a mailed notice of the

Entry of Default" satisfies due process even when the defendant does nothing).
As it relates to the accusation that Defendants did not receive due process as a
result of the "particularly biased" tribal court, this argument should be rejected as
baseless. The Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments of "local bias and
incompetence" when objecting to tribal court jurisdiction. In Iowa Mutual the Supreme
Court held,
Petitioner also contends that the policies underlying the grant of
diversity jurisdiction-protection against local bias and
incompetence-justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this
case. We have rejected similar attacks on tribal court jurisdiction in
the past. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S., at 65,
and n. 21, 98 S.Ct., at 1680, and n. 21. The alleged incompetence
of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement established in National Farmers Union, 471 U.S., at
856, n. 21, 105 S.Ct., at 2454, n. 21, and would be contrary to the
congressional policy promoting the development of tribal courts.
Moreover, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, provides
non-Indians with various protections against unfair treatment in the
tribal courts.
480 U.S. at18-19.
Defendant also argues the Tribe "has not hesitated to impose a large civil penalty
of $500 per day." The Tribe is unclear if the Johnsons are arguing the Tribe has not
hesitated to impose a $500 per day civil penalty in this case or in other cases. To the
extent the Johnsons were referencing other cases, such facts would be irrelevant to
determining the issue of due process in the present case even if those alleged cases had
been identified.
To the extent the Johnsons are arguing the Tribe did not hesitate to "impose a
large civil penalty of $500 per day" in the present case, they are simply wrong. First,
although the Coeur D'Alene Tribal Code does authorize a civil penalty in the amount of
$500 per day, CIC 44-24.01, the Tribe only sought and received a penalty of $100 per
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day. The Tribe's decision to only seek 20% of what they were entitled to seek was made
to demonstrate the Tribe's good will towards its neighbors even when those neighbors
fail to respect the sovereignty of the Coeur D'Alene Tribe. Second, the J ohnsons do not
provide any argument or comparative analysis of other penalties which demonstrates a
$500 per day penalty is "a large civil penalty" or this it violates due process. In any event,
the point is not relevant as the Tribe did not seek or receive a $500 per day penalty
against the Johnsons.
The evidence in this case, Supreme Court case law, and Idaho law refutes each of
the Johnsons' arguments regarding a deficiency in due process. The Johnsons received
more due process than required by Idaho law. The Supreme Court has previously rejected
an allegation of bias as reason to not exhaust tribal remedies. Finally, the argument of
$500 per day fines being excessive is not relevant since the Tribe did not seek this
penalty. Therefore, this Court should reject Defendant's arguments that the Johnsons did
not receive adequate due process.
D.

Penal Law Rule Does Not Apply

The Johnsons argue the Penal Law Rule prohibits this Court from recognizing the
monetary penalty imposed by the Tribal Court against them for their encroachment. The
Johnsons do not argue application of the Penal Law Rule to the order ejecting the
encroachment, only the fine. Significantly, the Johnsons have not cited any case law
applying the Penal Law Rule to tribal judgments.
Comity generally holds that "one notation affords recognition within its territory
to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation." US. v. Federative
Republic ofBrazil, 748 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2014). The Penal Law Rule is an exception to
the principles of comity and the Full Faith and Credit clause. Id at 91. The Penal law
Rule holds that the Courts of one country will not execute the penal laws of another. Id.
at 92 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
The policy reasons on which the Penal Law Rule rest are not applicable to the
judgment of tribal courts. Further, the trust relationship between federally recognized
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tribes and the United States is significantly different that the relationship between the
various states and between the United States and other nations. This Court should deny
Defendants' application of the rule to this case.
In Sheppard v. Sheppard the Idaho Supreme Court indicated that courts should
consider holdings that "facilitate better relations between the courts of this state and the
various tribal courts within Idaho." This reasoning is a reflection of the special
relationship between tribes, the federal government, and the State of Idaho. In Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall described the relationship between tribes

and the federal government as "domestic dependent nations" and which "resemble that of
a ward to his guardian." 30 U.S. 1, 17. Justice Marshall went on to say "They look to our
government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to
their wants .... " Id. at 17. The unique position of Indian tribes "is perhaps unlike that of
any other two people in existence .... But the relation of the Indians to the United States
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else." Id. at 16.
Cohens 's Handbook of Federal Indian Law describes the trust relationship as,

A robust and protective trust doctrine evolved in the contemporary
era, however. Nearly every piece of modern legislation dealing
with Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust
relationship between tribes and the federal governments. Many
administrative actions invoke the trust relationship as a basis for
regulations implementing federal statutes. Most modem
presidents' policy statements regarding tribes also reaffirm the
trust relationship.

§ 5.04(3)(a), 2012 Edition. Because of the unique relationship "which exist[s] nowhere
else" this Court should decline to follow case law involving the relationship between the
various states and the relationship between the United States and foreign nations.

In essence, the Johnsons are asking this Court to do two things. First, the
Johnsons ask this Court to breach the trust relationship afforded Indian tribes by refusing
to recognize the judgment of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. The Johnsons' request would
foreclose a tribe's ability to use its judicial system to seek redress for injuries committed
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by non-Indians against the tribe while on tribal land. This result is not supported by any
policy or case law. Second, the Johnsons ask this state court to expand federal common
law as it relates to the Penal Law Rule. In making this request Defendant offers no legal
authority in the pantheon of Indian case law, treatises, or other secondary sources which
supports the application of the Penal Law Rule to tribes. Nor has the Tribe been able to
find such case law. Thus, this court would have to expand federal common law prior to
applying it in this case.
Therefore, this Court should deny the Johnsons invitation to enlarge federal
common law by applying the Penal Law Rule to a circumstance in which it has never
been applied.

III.

CONCLUSION

As noted at the outset of the Tribe's Reply, in Idaho "A final judgment entered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed valid and therefore the party asserting the
invalidity of the judgment must carry the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the
presumption." Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 7. Therefore, the Johnsons must present evidence
which overcomes the presumption of validity. The Johnsons' various arguments are
unsupported by any evidence or case law. Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this
Court deny each of the Johnsons' objections and grant the Tribe's Motion for an Order
of Recognition of the Tribal Court judgment.
DATED this ~ M a y , 2016.
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all counsel of record as follows:

Norman M. Semanko
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields,
Chartered
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Ph: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384
nms@moffatt.com

D By United States mail
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ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT
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WHEREAS the Honorable Fred M. Gibler serving as District Judge of the First
Judicial District has recently retired, and

WHEREAS Scott Wayman has been appointed as District Judge for the First
Judicial District, to fill the vacancy created by Judge Gibler's retirement, now, therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all cases previously assigned to Judge Gibler as
District Judge, #115, be and hereby are, assigned to the Honorable Scott Wayman, #009.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order of Reassignment be
placed in the file of each case reassigned to Judge Wayman.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of each county
within the First Judicial District shall mail a copy of the Order of Reassignment to
counsel for each of the parties, or, if either of the parties are represented pro se, directly
to the pro se litigant in each case to be reassigned.
DATED this~ day of March, 2016

l~¥!LU;"l~

Lansing~Haynes
Administrative District Judge
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Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
nms@moffatt.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

COVER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,

Plaintiff,

vs.
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,

Case No. CV-2016-0025

AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ORDER OF
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Benewah

)
) ss.
)

Kenneth Johnson, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as
follows:
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1.

I am over eighteen years of age and am a party to the above-entitled

action. I make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge and I am competent to testify
regarding the matters contained herein.
2.

On May 19, 2016, I took measurement readings of the water levels on

pilings in the St. Joe River, located at my property, 520 Shephard Road, St. Maries, Idaho 83861.
My wife, Donna Johnson, took pictures of the measurement readings on the pilings on this date.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken

by my wife on April 18, 2016, of the above-mentioned pilings. The picture depicts the location
of the pilings from the shore, located at my property. The picture is a fair and accurate
representation of the pilings and other objects in the picture.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken

by my wife on April 18, 2016, of the above-mentioned pilings. The picture depicts the location
of the pilings from the shore, located at my property. The picture is a fair and accurate
representation of the pilings and other objects in the picture.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken

by my wife on May 19, 2016, of the piling closest to the shore. The picture depicts the reading
of the water measurement at a depth of three (3) feet, six (6) and a halfinches. The picture is a
fair and accurate representation of the measurement on the piling closest to the shore on May 19.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D, is a true and correct copy of a picture, taken

by my wife on May 19, 2016, of the piling furthest from the shore. The picture depicts the
reading of the water measurement at a depth of four (4) feet, eight (8) inches. The picture is a
fair and accurate representation of the measurement on the piling furthest from the shore on May
19.
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7.

On May 19, 2016, I observed that the water level of the St. Joe River was

recorded on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) website as
2128.35 feet. Based on my personal knowledge, this is four (4) inches below the summer river

level.
8.

My dock, the bulk of which I have caused to be removed, was affixed to

the pilings described herein.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

.

Ke~~~
3;s+

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this-=--- day of May, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of June, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Everett B. Coulter Jr.
EV ANS CRAVEN

& LACKIE, PS

818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
Facsimile (509) 455-3632
Attorneys for Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON - 4

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
~vernight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Client:4164279.1

IDe

EXHIBIT D

a

FILED

rr~1:-\11!:-~ qr-r,!
. 'lc'T'(
r-

"

~-- I

L_.-

·.;

f

1

:.,..' .._,~

~-

t j ) ,.

EVERETT B. COULTER, JR.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
(509) 455-5200; fax (509) 455-3632

Attorneys for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-2016-0025
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S MOTION
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
KENNETH JOHNSON

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff in the above case, by and through its attorneys,
Everett B. Coulter, Jr., of Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., and moves the Court for an
Order Striking the Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson as untimely, irrelevant, expert testimony
from an unqualified witness, and offers hearsay testimony.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue currently pending before this Court is whether the Coeur D'Alene
Tribal Court Judgment (hereinafter "the Tribal Judgment") in favor of the Coeur D'Alene
Tribe (hereinafter "the Tribe") and against the Johnsons should be recognized under
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
MOTION TO STRIKE
JOHNSON AFFIDAVIT Page 1
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Idaho law. The Tribe initiated these proceedings by filing a motion and legal
memorandum, the Johnsons filed a Response, and the Tribe filed a Reply. Then, on June
2, 2016, the Coeur D'Alene Tribe received the Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson in

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(hereinafter "the Johnson Affidavit"). The Johnson Affidavit submits four pictures and
other information regarding the water level of the St. Joe River. It is unclear how the
information contained within the Johnson Affidavit is relevant to the issue of whether
Idaho should recognize the Tribal Court judgment pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause (or principals of comity as the Johnsons have previously advocated) or what Rule
of Idaho Civil Procedure the Johnsons rely on in submitting the same. In addition, the
Johnsons never provided the information contained within the Johnson Affidavit to the
Tribal Court for consideration in the underlying litigation. In short, it appears the
Johnsons are attempting to litigate the underlying dispute on the merits before this Court
even though the merits are not before this Court and even though the Johnsons willfully
choose to not appear or answer the Tribe's Complaint in Tribal Court.
Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this Court strike the Johnson Affidavit
because it is untimely, irrelevant to the sole issue before this Court, scientific testimony,
and, in part, prohibited by the rule against hearsay.
II.
A.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Johnson Affidavit Is Untimely and Not Permitted by the Rules.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a motion and supporting brief

shall be filed with the court and served on the parties at least fourteen days prior to the
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
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hearing date. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E). The Rules further provide that any responsive briefs
shall be filed with the court and served on the other parties "at least seven (7) days prior
to the hearing." I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E). The Rules finally allow the moving party to file a
reply. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E); Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 159 Idaho
813, 220 (2016). The Rules do not allow for the non-moving party to submit affidavits or
other legal arguments after their responsive brief or after the moving party has replied.
The Rules recognize litigants must serve opposing briefs and affidavits within certain
time limits so that an opposing party may adequately respond. Arregui v. Gallegos-Main,
153 Idaho 801, 805 (2012) (discussing time requirements in connection with summary
judgment proceedings). A court may strike affidavits not complying with time
requirements. Id. at 805.
In the present case, the Johnsons served a twenty-five page Response such that the
Tribe received it on May 10, 2016. The hearing was scheduled for May 13, 2016. This
three day window violated the Rules and provided an insufficient amount of time for the
Tribe to draft an adequate reply. The Tribe did not move to strike this late Response but
instead sought to reschedule the hearing in order to adequately reply. The Tribe filed their
Reply on May 20. This should have been the final filing of the parties. However, the
Johnsons now submit the Johnson Affidavit which attempts to improperly insert evidence
in to the record. The Rules do not provide for further briefing, affidavits, or submissions
of evidence from the parties regarding the issue before the court.
In addition, the Johnson Affidavit does not set forth an adequate foundation which
establishes Mr. Johnson is qualified to testify about scientific measurements of a river's
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
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depth or explain other scientific observations of the river. Nor does the affidavit
adequately set forth the method that was utilized in making the purported measurements.
In short, there is simply no way to ensure the scientific reliability of the measurements or
their import.
Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this Court strike the Johnson Affidavit
as untimely.
B.

The Johnson Affidavit is Irrelevant Because the Water Level Has No Bearing
of Recognizing a Foreign Judgment

Even if the Johnson Affidavit were timely filed, served and considered by this
Court, its contents are irrelevant because the sole issue before this Court is whether to
recognize a foreign judgment. The depth of the St. Joe River is irrelevant to the legal
analysis of this issue.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. "Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible." I.R.E. 402; State v. Elisondo, 114 Idaho 412, 430 (1988). As discussed in
previous arguments already submitted to this Court, Idaho applies a full faith and credit
analysis to determine whether to recognize a judgment from a tribal court. Sheppard v.

Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7 (1982).

Therefore, a judgment from a tribal court with

competent jurisdiction, "is presumed valid and ... the party asserting the invalidity of the
judgment must carry the burden of proof sufficient to overcome the presumption." Id. at
7.

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
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In the present case, the Johnsons' Response argued the Tribal Court lacked

subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Tribe provided their Reply on May 20,
2016. Now, the Johnsons submit the Johnson Affidavit without any legal analysis or
other indication on how its information is relevant. It appears the Johnsons are attempting
to introduce evidence in this proceeding after the Tribe pointed out in their Reply that
there was no evidence in the record to support the Johnsons' factual assertions. By
pointing out their evidentiary short fall and inability to overcome the presumption of
validity, the Tribe was not extending an invitation for the Johnsons to insert evidence in
this proceeding at the eleventh hour. Rather, the Tribe was highlighting the Johnsons'
arguments on the merits of the case are not supported by the record because they
deliberately chose to not appear in the Tribal Court proceedings. Syringa Networks, 159
Idaho at 221 (litigants who make "strategic gamble not to argue the merits" of their case
in lower proceedings may not argue a lack of fairness for not being given a second
opportunity to do so when the gamble does not pay off).
Even if the information provided by the Johnson Affidavit was relevant to the
issue of jurisdiction, the Johnsons have not exhausted their tribal remedies on the issue
of jurisdiction. As discussed in the Tribe's Reply, litigants must make and exhaust
challenges to a tribe's jurisdiction in the tribal courts prior to making the challenge in
other forums. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) ("[T]he
federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in
order to give the tribal court a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction ...
unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in direct competition with the
COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
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tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over reservation affairs.") The same
policy requiring federal courts to give tribal courts an opportunity to answer their own
jurisdictional questions comports with the stated policy of Idaho courts. See, e.g.,
Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8 (recognizing that facilitating "better relations between the

courts of this state and the various tribal courts within Idaho" is an important judicial
policy).
Further, if the Johnsons are attempting to use the Johnson Affidavit to challenge
the ownership of the land on which the dock rests, and therefore subject matter
jurisdiction, this issue goes to the merits of the Tribal Case in addition to the issue of
jurisdiction. The Johnsons deliberately gambled by choosing not to appear or respond in
Tribal Court and should now be prevented from litigating the merits of the Tribe's
Complaint in this Court. See, e.g., Syringa, 159 Idaho at 221, supra.
C.

Kenneth Johnson is not Qualified to Provide Expert Testimony

"Under the rules, expert opinion testimony is only admissible when the expert is a
qualified expert in the field, the evidence will be of assistance to the trier of fact, [and]
experts in the particular filed would reasonably rely upon the same type of facts relied
upon by the expert in forming his opinion ... " Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140
(2009). "In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court must evaluate
the expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles
to the formulation of his or her opinion. Admissibility, therefore, depends on the validity
of the expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion."

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S
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Id. at 140. An expert's opinion does not meet the required standards of reliability when it

is based on a "mere temporal connection" between two events. Id. at 140.
In the present case, there is no evidence that Mr. Johnson is qualified in the study
of a relevant field (such as ecology, environmental sciences, geology, hydrology, or
limnology 1) such that he is competent to provide evidence regarding the depth of the St.
Joe River. Mr. Johnson provides no explanation of methodology or explanation of how
other factors may impact the purported depth. Nor does Mr. Johnson explain how the
river's depth may fluctuate from day to day or between the seasons. Instead, Mr. Johnson
attempts to make a "mere temporal connection" and offers the depth of the river at a
single instant in time and leaves it to the Tribe and the Court to determine their
significance. See, e.g., Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140, supra. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, Mr. Johnson provides no testimony regarding the location of the dock's
pilings which would seem to be more important regarding the issue of land ownership.
Thus, even if Mr. Johnson made accurate measurements the Johnson Affidavit must still
be excluded because "admissibility ... depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning
and methodology, rather than [the] ultimate conclusion." Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140.
Therefore, the Johnson Affidavit must be excluded because it attempts to offer
scientific testimony from an affiant who is unqualified to offer the same.

1

Limnology is the study of inland waters.
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D.

The Johnson Affidavit Offers Hearsay Testimony

Even if this Court decides to accept the Johnson Affidavit, the Johnson Affidavit
should be excluded to the extent it offers hearsay testimony. Hearsay is a statement,
including a written assertion, " ... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." I.R.E. 801. Hearsay is not admissible as evidence unless provided for by the
Rules of Evidence or some other rule. I.R.E. 802.
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." I.R.E. 602;
Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 369 P.3d 299, 303 (2015).

An affidavit "based on

hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge" does not satisfy the requirements of
an affidavit." Id.
Paragraph Seven of the Johnson Affidavit offers testimony about statements
purportedly made by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on
their website. The statement contained on the NOAA website is an out of court statement
and the matter asserted is the depth of the St. Joe River. The Johnson Affidavit does not
cite to any exception to the general rule against hearsay which would make the statement
admissible. In addition, the offered testimony about the measurements of the St. Joe
River are not based on Mr. Johnson's personal knowledge but are instead based on the
knowledge of a third party. Therefore, the offered evidence is clearly hearsay, not based
on personal knowledge, and prohibited by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 801, 802.
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Since the offered statement is inadmissible hearsay for which no exception
applies and not based on personal knowledge, this Court should, at minimum, strike
Paragraph Seven of the Johnson Affidavit.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Johnson Affidavit is untimely, irrelevant to the issues before the Court, and
attempts to offer expert scientific evidence from an unqualified witness. Further, the
Johnson Affidavit contains hearsay. The sole issue before the Court is whether the Tribal
Judgment should be recognized in Idaho. Therefore, the Tribe respectfully requests this
Court strike the Johnson Affidavit.

DATED this_(,_ day of June, 2016.

LACKIE, P.S.

LTER, ID #3768
eys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on the (,~day of June, 2016, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
all counsel ofrecord as follows:

Norman M. Semanko
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields,
Chartered
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Ph: (208) 345-2000
Fax: (208) 385-5384
nrns@moffatt.com
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Norman M. Semanko, ISB No. 4761
Sarah A. McCormack, TSB No. 9683
MOFf'A1T, THOMAS, BARRETTi ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000 ·
Fac:simile (208) 385-5384
nms@moffatt.com
sam@moffatt.com
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Attorneys lbr Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY or BENEWAH
COUER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. CV-2016-0025

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.
COME NOW Kenneth and Donna Johnson ("Defendants") in the above case, by
and

through their attomeys,

MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK

& FIELDS, CHARTERED, and file

this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson.
For reasons set forth below, the Coner d'Alene Tribe's ("Plaintiff') motion should be denied.
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I.

I

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's recollection of these court proceedings is incomplete. The Plaintiff.
itself, has filed two affidavits in this matter, which they neglected to mention. On January 22,
2016, Plaintiff initiated these proceedings by filing an Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of
Foreign Judgment as Per LC. 10-1303. Then, on March 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment (the "Motion1') with a Memorandum in Support of the
Motion and another affidavit, this time from Everett B. Coulter, Jr., in support of the Motion.
Defondants filed a timely Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Order of
Recognition of Foreign Judgment on May 6, 2016, and Plaintiff filed a Reply in Support of
Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment on May 20, 2016. On June 1, 2016,
Defendants filed the Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson in Opposition to Plainti1rs Motion for Order
of Recognition of .Foreign Judgment ("Johnson Affidavit").
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Johnson Affidavit Is Timely According to the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiff argues that the Johnson Affidavit is untimely according to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(E). Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit, at 2-3 (June 6,

2016). However, Plaintiff erroneously cites to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(E).
Instead, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b )(3 )(B) provides the rule on time limits for filing:
affidavits and states the following:
When a motion is supported by a:ffidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be
served with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed
with the court and served so Chat it is received by the Qarties no
later than seven (7) days before the hearing.
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I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Therefore, according to the correct rule, Defendants have
up to seven (7) days before the hearing to file an affidavit in opposition to the Motion. Contrary
to Plaintiff's contention, there is no language in the rule providing that the nonmoving party
cannot submit affidavits after their responsive brief is submitted. Under the plain language of the
rule, Defendants may file opposing affidavits up to seven (7) days prior to a hearing_
Defendants filed and served the Johnson Affidavit on June 2, 2016, a full eight (8)
days before the hearing on the Motion, which is scheduled for June 10, 2016. Therefore, the
affidavit was timely filed and is pennitted by the rules.
B.

The Johnson Affidavit Is Relevant to Whether the Tribal Court Has Subject
Matter and Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants.
PJaintiff argues that the contents of the Johnson Affidavit are irrelevant to the

lcgaJ analysis of the issues. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit, at 4 (June 6,
2016). However, Plaintiff is incorrect. "Relevant evidence means evidence having any lendency

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it wouJd be without the evidence.,, T.R.E. 401. As stated in
previous briefing, both Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1992), and Wilson v.
Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. I 997), prohibit the recognition of a tribal judgment when

the tribal court does not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Here, the overriding legal
question is whether the Coeur d'Alene Tribe tribal court has jurisdiction over the Defendants,
which will help determine whether its foreign judgment will be recognized by this Court. One of
the main issues in that analysis is whether the Coeur d'AJene Tribe owns the land underlying the
St. Joe River at the location of Defendants' dock and pilings. The facts presented in the Johnson
Affidavit relates directly to that issue.
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In arguing that the depth of the water at the location of Defendants' dock and
pilings is irrelevant, Plaintiff ignores clear issues of law and fact present in this case regarding
jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have
specifically recognized that the United States only reserved the submerged lands that existed
prior to Statehood in 1890. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); United States v.
Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the finding that the United States reserved the

1873 submerged lands for the Tribe). The Ninth Circuit specifically stated as follows:
In construing the parties' pleadings, we bear in mind that the
current physical situation in and around [Heyburn State) Park
differs from the situation that existed in 1873, at the time of the
executive reservation, and in 1908 and 1911, the years,
respectively, that the Park was authorized and conveyed to the
State. Due to the construction of [Post Falls] dam, three smaU
lakes have combined wir.h the [Coeur d'Alene] Lake into one large
body of water. We read the United States' complaint in light of the
physical situation as it existed prior to the construction of the dam.
United States, 210 F.3d at 1079, n. 18.

It is well established that additional lands within the reservation boundary became
submerged only afler ihe construction of Post Falls Dam in I 907. See, e.g., In re Sanders Beach,
143 Idaho 443,147 P.3d 75 (2006); Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208,970 P.2d 1 (1998);

Deffenbaugh v. Wash. Water Power Co., 24 Idaho 514, 135 P. 247 (1913); Petajaniemi v. Wash.
Water Power Co., 22 Idaho 20, 124 P. 783 (1912); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho

595, 115 P. 682(1911). ln fact, the dam has been recognized "as raising the elevation of the

water ... approximately 6 l /2 feet . . . . This increased height in the dam naturally resulted in
submerging the lands adjacent to Coeur d'Alene Lake and the streams flowing into the lands to
an elevation of at least 2,126.5 feet." In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 PJd 75
(emphasis added); see also Deffenbaugh, 24 Idaho at 520-21, 135 P.2d at 253-54 ("the elevation
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is raised six or eight feet above the ordinary elevation of the water in the summer and fall").
Therefore, the depth of the water at the location of Defendants' dock and pilings is a relevant and
important issue to this case, as it relates to the jurisdiction of the tribal court over these particular
submerged lands.
In addition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not exhaust their "tribal
remedies" on the issue of jurisdiction. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit, at 5
(June 6, 2016). Defendants have already addressed this issue in the context of the lack of due
process afforded to them in the original tribal court proceeding. See Memorandum in Opposition

to Plaintiff's Motion.for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, at 11-12 (May 6, 2016).
Furthermore, there is a specific exception to the exhaustion requirement when the interests of
justice so require. lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232,237,207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009).
"'[F]ailure to exhaust ... remedies is not a bar to litigation when there are no remedies lo exhaust."
Id at 40, 71. The Coeur d'Alene tribal code states that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe has ''exclusive

sovereignty and dominion over the submerged lands and waters within the area now known as
the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." CTC 44-1.01. Clearly, this tribal code supports broad

authority of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe over all submerged lands and the water overlying them~
within the entirety of the current exterior boundaries of the reservation. This interpretation has
been heavily reinforced by Plaintiff's briefing and the enforcement actions taken. It is pointless
to Mgue otherwise in a court where tribal code governs. Therefore, there were no remedies for

Defendant to exhaust in tribal court, which is governed by tribal law and assumptions, and
Defendants are excepted from the exhaustion requirement.
Plaintiff also argues that, by filing the Johnson Affidavit, Defendants ''insert

evidence in this proceeding at the eleventh hour." Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Mo/ion to Strike
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Ajjldavil, at 5 (June 6, 2016). However, this is a mischaracterization of Defendants' actions,
First, as established above, Defendants timely filed the Johnson Affidavit in opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion. Second, Defendants took the pictures and completed the measurement
readings before Plaintiff's request for more facts in the case. Mr. Johnson's wife, Donna
Johnson, took the pictures of the pilings on April 18, 2016, and took the pictures of the
measurements on May 19, 2016. See Johnson Affidavit, 11 3-6 (June 1, 2016). Plaintiff filed its
reply brief asking Defendants for "facts of the case" on May 20, 2016. See Coeur d'Alene

Tribe's Reply in Supporl ofMotion/or Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, at 8 (May 20,
2016). Therefore, it is clear that Defendants collected the evidence provided in the Johnson
Affidavit prior to the Plaintiff's request for more facts, and provided the facts in a timely manner.
Therefore, the facts presented in the Johnson Affidavit are relevant to the issues at
hand and are admissible.
C.

Kenneth Johnson Is Qualified as a Lay Witness to Testify about His Own

Property.
Plaintiff argues that Kenneth Johnson is not qualified to provide expert testimony
about the depth of the St. Joe River. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavir, at 6-7
(June 6, 2016). First, the testimony provided by Mr. Johnson in the Johnson Affidavit is not
expert testimony. Mr. Johnson did not take a11y specialized or expert readings of the depth of the
river. He simply attached a ruler to the pilings near his property and read the measurements. It
does not take an expert in the fields of ecology, environmental sciences, geology, hydrology or
limnology to read a measurement on a mler.
Second) Mr. Johnson is qualified as a lay witness under Rule of Evidence 701.
Rule 701 provides:
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If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the
witness in the fonn of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding
of the testimony of the witness or the detennination of a fact in
issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Mr. Johnson's testimony clearly fits the criteria for lay witness testimony. The
pictures and measurements provided in the Johnson Affidavit are rationally based on
Mr. Johnson's perception, they are helpful to a clear determination of the facts at issue and they
are not based on any Specialized knowledge. In addition, "[a] landowner is a competent witness
to the location of the boundaries of his own land if they are within his personal knowledge, and
may testify to the same." Hook v. Horner, 95 Idaho 657, 663, 517 P.2d 554, 560 (1973). The
landowner's interest in the outcome of the litigation may affect the weight given to his
testimony, but will not affect its admissibility. Id. Mr. Johnson is competent to testify regarding
his property since it is within his personal knowledge and his interest in this litigation will not
affect the admissibility of that testimony.
Therefore, Mr. Johnson is qualified as a lay witness to testify about his property.
D.

The Testimony Provided in the Johnson Affidavit Is Admissible Because It

FaUs Under the Public Records Exception to Hearsay.

Plaintiff argues that the testimony provided in the Joh11son Affidavit regarding the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's ("NOAA") measurements of the St. Joe
River is hearsay. Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Molion to Strike Affidavit, at 8 (June 6, 2016). First,

Mr. Johnson testified as to his recollection and personal knowledge of the NOAA measurement
on May 19, 2016 and did not quote directly from website.
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Second, even if the evidence presented was directly from the website, Rule of
Evidence 803(8) provides an exception to hearsay for public records and reports. The rule
describes the applicable documents under the exception as follows:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations in any form of a
public office or agency sttting forth its regularly conducted and
regularly recorded activities> or matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the opponent shows the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
l.R.E. 803(8).

NOAA regularly measures and reports the depth of the St. Joe River on its
website for public review. This kind of public information falls under the public records
exception to hearsay. I.R.E. 803(8); See also, Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm, Co_, 760 F. Supp. 2d 220,
235 (D.N.H. 2011) (in an action based on the defective design ofa prescription drug, a Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") al1alysis was admitted into evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(8) and 902 since it was a self-authenticating public record available on the FDNs
website)_ The recorded measurements by NOAA are public records setting forth its regularly
conducted and regularly recorded activities.

Therefore, the testimony provided regarding the NOAA measurements falls under
the public records exception to hearsay and is admissible.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiff's
Motion be denied.
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DATED this 8th day of June, 2016.
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRBTI, RocK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

HL

By~
9,_
Sarah A. McConnack - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of June, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRlKE AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH JOHNSON to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Everett B. Coulter Jr.
EVANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, PS

818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
facsimile (509) 455~3632
Altorneys for Plaintij)'

( ) U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Sarah A. McCormack
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1116 Mr Coulter addresses the court. The united state supreme court has give the tribe
jurisdiction. A notice was sent to them, after judgment entered the only time the responded
was to this action. They have had ample notice. Jurisdiction wants to be challenged in
another court but not in the court over them. Argument re penal law rule somehow barrs
recognition of this jdgmt. There was a $17,400 money jdgmt premised on $100/day. Also
finding of trespass and eviction; not penal. They have dock in waters w / out permit.
Applicable to $ amount not trespass. Pilings are there, CDA found.
1127 Semanko addresses court for Johnsons. They've had the pilings/dock all the time
they've been there. Refers to title 10 in re adoption ofrecogn code. We can argue about
code 10.13.01. in re 10.13.09 no part of state will enforce order in re public policy of state.
This is filed under 10.13.01. this provision added in 2015 but applies to all jdmts. Decision
by CDA is contrary to decisions by ID. At time reservation was set aside, the portion of
river did not exist. CDA tribal code was adopted w/out accountability and now johnsons
have no right to vote on tribal matters. Even under Chap 13 believe there will be a problem.
Chapters 13 and 14; need subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic, and due process,
cannot be penal judgmt. 10.14.04 court of this state will not recognize something rendered
a penalty or fine. Penal law rule applies in full faith and credit. In re penal judgmt, it is penal
to ask Johnsons to remove their dock. This is a tribal government enforcing rights of a tribe
as a whole. We believe entire judgmt is penal in nature. We don't see how this judgment
can be recognized by court under penal law rule.

1134 Semanko in re jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction - not addressed in the
affidavits. Tribal court says they have jurisdiction but order says nothing about personal
jurisdiction over Johnsons. w /regard to personal jurisdiction, Johnsons aren't in this by
consensual relationship. Pg 4 brief by plaintiff says they have exclusive sovereignty saying
this point of river is held in trust by government by tribe. They think they own everything
w/in reservation that is submerged, i.e., lagoons, flooded areas, reserved lands in 1800s.
No limitation, no recognition of exactly what submerged lands. Sup. Court continually
refers to 1873 and 9 th cir confirmed. Dam has added 6.5-8 ft to rivers. Johnson dock is not
out in the middle of the river. Add'tl submerged lands were not subject. Court says they
were looking at land before dam was built and would not give them add'tl land when after
dam was built.Tribe has admitted Johnson's dock is in the shallow waters. If there is no
subject matter jurisdiction then there is no personal matter jurisdiction.

1141 Coulter - counsel suggests a trespass is not an eviction - no authority to say that. In
re personal and subject matter jurisdiction; regulatory and adjudicatory granted to tribes
and that is the subject matter jurisd. No argument, no response; and you challenge the
jurisdiction. Federal law is you need to give tribal court the opportu to look and make
jurisdic challenges and deal w /it. Johnson's affidavits in re pilings, they don't seem to
address it, very far down in the river bed. Asking not to overrule Shepherd in this case. not
arguing under comedy, set up under full faith and credit. Asking tribal court judgment be
entitled to recognition by this court.

1144 Judge - I'm not going to give everybody a decision today. Thanks lawyers for doing a
very good job for their clients. Court fully appreciates importance of this case to the
Johnsons. Court also appreciates importance to tribe and appreciates potential impact of
court's decision on anybody else in re same circumstance as Johnsons. Important to get
this right.No matter which way I rule, somebody won't be happy and likely would appeal.
Takes UNDER ADVISEMENT and more likely issue written opinion and order w /my
findings and rationale. I will notify and send out order.

1146 Nothing from either party. IN RECESS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

I
I
I
I CASE NO. CV-2016-25
I
I MEMORANDUM OPINION
I
I
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I
INTRODUCTION

Every year, in courts all across the State of Idaho, judgments entered in
other state courts and federal courts are enforced in Idaho pursuant to the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

I.C. §10-1301 et. seq.

This case

presents the question whether a judgment by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court
against a non-tribal member may be enforced in similar fashion.

While the

question is simple to state, the answer is not so simple. The answer involves the
interplay of state law, federal law, and tribal law. The answer also involves the

examination of state court decisions, federal court decisions, and tribal court
decisions.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe requests recognition of a default judgment issued
by its tribal court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260, fining defendants Kenneth
and Donna Johnson, and entitling the Tribe to remove a dock encroaching on a
riverbed held in trust for the tribe by the federal government.

See, Idaho v.

United States, 533 U.S. 262, 121 S. Ct. 2135, 150 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2001). The
Johnsons oppose recognition of the judgment.
This appears to be a case of first impression in Idaho. Neither party has
cited the court to a controlling opinion from an Idaho appellate court. Nor has the
Court's research found any controlling legal authority.

II

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff is the Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe), a federally recognized
Indian Tribe.

The defendants, Kenneth and Donna Johnson, (the Johnsons),

own river front real property on the St. Joe River in Benewah County.

The

Johnsons have a dock and pilings that extend into the river from their property.
The Johnsons are not members of the Tribe.

The Tribe does not own the

Johnson's real property.
The Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Johnsons in the tribal court of the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe seeking damages and removal of the Johnson's dock
because the Johnsons did not obtain a dock permit from the Tribe to allow them
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to encroach upon lands controlled by the Tribe: the submerged lands beneath
the St. Joe River within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Reservation.
Although the Johnsons were served with the summons and complaint in the tribal
court proceeding, they did not appear or answer. As a result of their failure to
appear in the tribal court proceeding, a default judgment was entered against
them imposing a civil penalty of $17,400 and entitling the Tribe to remove the
encroachments.
The tribal court judgment was entered on April 1, 2015.

It remains

unsatisfied.
On January 22, 2016 the Tribe filed an Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of
Foreign Judgment seeking an order validating and recognizing the tribal court
judgment in order to begin enforcement efforts.

The Tribe has satisfied the

procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq. by filing a certified copy of the
tribal court judgment and supporting affidavit. After receiving notice of the filing
of the judgment, the Johnsons retained counsel and have objected to the Tribe's
request to have the tribal court judgment recognized by the State of Idaho.
Both parties have submitted legal memoranda in support of their
respective positions. Both parties have submitted supporting affidavits.

The

Tribe has moved to strike the affidavit of Kenneth Johnson on the basis that it
was untimely filed, is irrelevant, and contains hearsay. The Court will not strike
the affidavit, but the Court will only consider the portions of the affidavit that
would be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

3

Ill
ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN ORDER
RECOGNIZING A JUDGMENT FROM THE COEUR D'ALENE TRIBAL COURT
AGAINST A NON-TRIBAL MEMBER FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT.
IV
DISCUSSION

A. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion

The Tribe's legal position is very straight forward.

Pursuant to the

decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard v Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655
P.2d 895, (1982), tribal court decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. The
Tribe has satisfied the procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq, and is
now entitled to enforce the tribal court judgment in state court.
The application of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in most
cases is simply a ministerial act as long a judgment creditor complies with the
procedural requirements of the act.

Enforcement of the foreign judgment can

begin five days after the date the judgment is filed. I.C. §10-1303(c).

The Tribe

has not sought to enforce its judgment. Instead, and to the credit of both parties,
the Johnsons and the Tribe have sought a court ruling before any enforcement
actions have been sought based upon the tribal court judgment.
Whether or not an Idaho court will recognize a foreign judgment is a
discretionary determination.

Even if all of the procedural requirements of the

Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act have been satisfied, an Idaho court is not
required to recognize a foreign judgment if the foreign judgment is not entitled to
full faith and credit in this state.

For example, if the court issuing the foreign
4
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judgment allegedly did not have personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendant,
the Idaho Court can inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's
decision to see whether the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. Schwi/ling

v. Horne, 105 Idaho 294,669 P.2d 183,(1983). A similar challenge can be made
to enforcement of a foreign judgment on the basis of a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction by the foreign court. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624,
596 P.2d 1068, (1978).
Once the foreign judgment has been filed and recognized in Idaho, the
judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses,
and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district
court of this state. I.C. §10-1302.

If the foreign judgment has been reversed or

modified by the issuing state, the Idaho court has the discretion to deny
enforcement of the foreign judgment.

P & R Enterprises, Inc. v. Guard, 102

Idaho 671,637 P. 2d 1167, (1981).

B. The Johnson's Objections
The Johnsons arguments against recognizing the tribal court judgment
against them may be summarized as follows. First, they contend that the tribal
court judgment cannot be recognized under the plain language of I. C. § 10-1301.
Second, they argue that the tribal court judgment should not be given full faith
and credit ,or be recognized as a matter of comity, because the tribal court
lacked both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and that the
Johnson's were denied due process of law. Third, they argue that enforcement
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of the tribal court judgment is prohibited by the penal law rule.

Each of these

challenges will be addressed below.

8(1) Can a Tribal Court judgment be recognized under Idaho Code §10-

1301?
The Johnsons argue that the tribal judgment cannot be recognized by the
state pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1301, which, according to the Johnsons, is
limited to judgments regarding support or the establishment of paternity. That
provision states:
In this act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order
of a court of the United States or of any other court or an order of
an administrative body of any state regarding the support of a child,
spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity which is
entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
(Emphasis added.) As the tribe argues, because the disjunctive conjunction "or"
precedes the referenced language, the limitations therein apply only to
administrative bodies, not courts.
The tribe notes that Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895,
901 (1982) held: "Tribal court decrees ... are ... entitled to full faith and credit."
The Johnsons contend that Sheppard was based upon an interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1738 which has since been "supplanted" by courts in other jurisdictions.
These courts have held that "judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory

or

Possession,"

tribal court proceedings.

as

set

out

in

the

statute,

do

not

include

The Sheppard court noted the existence of such

authority, but chose specifically not to follow it. The court held:

[Wle agree with those courts which have found the
phrase "Territories and Possessions" broad enough to
6

include Indian tribes, at least as · they are presently
constituted under the laws of the United States. Jim v. CIT
Financial Services, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975); In re
Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976);
Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir.1897); but see
Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689
(Ariz.App.1977) (tribal decrees entitled to comity but not full
faith and credit); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 23 Or.App. 393,
542 P.2d 918 (1975). See generally Ragsdale, Problems in
the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7
N.M.L.Rev. 133 (1977); Comment, Conflicts Between State
and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith and Credit
Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 Ariz.St.L.J. 801 (1981).
We believe that this holding will facilitate better relations
between the courts of this state and the various tribal courts
within Idaho.
Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8, 655 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added). In footnote 2, the
court stated:
It has come to the attention of this Court that, in an action
related to this case, the Shoshone-Bannock appellate court, in
reversing the tribal trial court, held that it was not required to
give full faith and credit to the decrees of Idaho state courts. In
part this decision was based on the belief that state courts
did not accord tribal courts full faith and credit. As we have
shown, some state courts, including this one, do. Secondly,
the tribal court failed to acknowledge 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which
requires "every court within the United States" to give full faith
and credit to decrees of state courts. Along with this opinion
extends the hope of a good working relationship between state
and tribal courts, and we hope, therefore, that the ShoshoneBannock courts will reconsider the application of full faith and
Indeed the commentators
credit in their proceedings.
unanimously agree that tribal courts must afford other states full
faith and credit.

Id. fn. 2 (emphasis added).
The Johnsons claim that because Sheppard involved a tribal court decree of
adoption, the decision in Sheppard to accord tribal judgments full faith and credit
was limited to family law judgments only.
limited full faith and credit in that manner.

Nothing in the opinion, however,

Sheppard has not been overturned or
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modified by a later opinion by the Idaho appellate courts. The district courts are
bound to follow the pronouncements of the appellate courts. Sheppard is
controlling precedent in Idaho and the rule of stare decisis dictates that lower
courts follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houghland Farms, Inc. v.
Johnson, 119 Idaho 97, 803 P. 2d 978, (1990). The Idaho Supreme Court, not
the district court, is the only court that can decide whether or not the Sheppard
case is manifestly wrong, has proven to be unjust or unwise over time, or must
be overruled to remedy an injustice.
Based on the plain language of I.C. §10-1031 and upon the Sheppard
case, the court finds that tribal court judgments may be enforced under the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

However, just because tribal court

judgments can be enforced under this act does not necessarily mean that the
judgment against the Johnsons is enforceable in this case.

8(2)

Did the tribal court have both subject matter jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction over the Johnsons to allow an Idaho court to grant full faith
and credit to the tribal court judgment?
The Johnson's claim that the tribal court judgment should not be
enforceable against them because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
judgment. A judgment entered by a foreign state that lacked personal or subject
matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment is void, and should not be accorded full

8
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faith and credit. Schwilling v. Horne, 105 Idaho 294, 669 P.2d 183 (1983); Sierra
Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 596 P.2d 1068, (1978). The Johnsons

cite to Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, (9 th Cir. 1997) in support of their
position. This Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision is based upon federal law,
not state law, so it is not controlling in Idaho in light of the Sheppard case. Even if
principles of comity outlined in Wilson v. Marchington applied to this case, the
analysis is the same: if the tribal court lacked proper subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, then the judgment should not be recognized and enforced.
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal members is a rather controversial
subject. The United States Supreme Court has attempted to clarify this area of
the law in a series of decisions beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 431 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), superseded on other
grounds by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2), (4) (1990). In Oliphant, the Court specifically

held that a tribal court has no jurisdiction to criminally charge or incarcerate nonIndians. Later cases have established a set of precedents that impose limitations
on the ability of a tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-tribal member in a
civil case.
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d
493 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to non-members of the tribe. The court
also held that there are two exceptions to this rule. They are commonly referred
to as "the consensual relations" exception and the "direct effects" exception.
Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal
authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it
relied support the general proposition that the inherent
9

sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be sure, Indian
tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements.(citations omitted) A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. (citations
omitted)

Montana v United States, 450 U.S. 455, (1981), at 565-566 (citations and
footnote omitted).

There is no basis for applying the "consensual relations" exception here.
The Johnson s have done nothing to support a finding that they have engaged in
consensual relationships with the Tribe or its members in any way, shape, or
form.

This case does not arise out of a business transaction or a contract

between the Johnsons and the Tribe or its members. They have not agreed to
submit to the tribal court's jurisdiction. They are not tribal members. The Tribe
does not own their land.

As non-tribal members they have no say in tribal

government issues, including any lake regulations and the operation of the tribal
court system.
The second exception of Montana v. United States is more problematic.
Under this exception, a tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
10
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that conduct threatens, or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. Id. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the Tribe to regulate that portion
of the bed and the banks of the St. Joe River that lie within the Coeur d'Alene
reservation. See, Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,121 S. Ct. 2135, 150 L.
Ed. 2d 326 (2001 ).

The Tribe's ability to regulate the activities affecting Coeur

d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River, such as encroachments, water quality, or
other use of the natural resources, is an important aspect of the treaty rights that
were recognized by the court. If the non-Indians who used the lake, or the river,
or more specifically to this case, those who allegedly encroach on the submerged
bed and banks of the waterways were not subject to the Tribe's rules, then the
ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. United States would
certainly be a hollow victory for the Tribe. Any non-Indian could simply thumb
their nose at the tribal enforcement efforts without any risk of consequence. The
regulatory authority of the tribe would be meaningless with regard to non-Indians.
The lake and the St Joe River are important to the tribe and the inability to control
the conduct of non-Indians when it directly affects the lake and the St Joe River
fall within the category of conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.
This is not the first time an Indian tribe has exercised regulatory control
over a waterway pursuant to treaty rights granted long ago. The Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation were involved in a long
running battle over the control of a portion of Flathead Lake. See, Confederated
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Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Resetvation v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951

(1982). After years of litigation, the tribe's right to control the activities of nontribal members was recognized when the activities affected that portion of
Flathead Lake within the reservation boundaries. Much like the tribes involved
with Flathead Lake, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe is exercising similar control over that
portion of the bed and banks of the lake and the St. Joe River within the
reservation.
There is another reason why the tribal court judgment in this case should
be given full faith and credit, or be recognized as a matter of comity as is done in
the federal court system. When a non-Indian defendant is sued in a tribal court
and wishes to challenge the ability of the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over
them, the non-Indian defendant is normally required to challenge the tribal court's
jurisdiction over them in the tribal court and exhaust all tribal remedies through
every level of the tribal court system before they will be allowed to raise the
jurisdictional issue in another forum. Nat'/ Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe
of/ndians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985).

The Johnsons never appeared in tribal court to raise a jurisdictional
challenge. The tribal court judgment in this case made a specific finding that it
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, and that the Johnsons
were given notice of the suit and the opportunity to appear. The tribe contends
that the tribal court judgment is entitled to full faith and credit because the
Johnsons failed to exhaust their remedies in tribal court before challenging
recognition of the tribal judgment in state court. Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock
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Land Use Policy Comm'n, 736 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir.2013) set out four
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. The court stated:
"Exhaustion is prudential; it is required as a matter of comity, not as
a jurisdictional prerequisite." Boozer [v. Wilder], 381 F.3d [931,] at
935 [9th Cir. 2004)] (citations omitted). To this end, the Supreme
Court has recognized four exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement: "(1) when an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is
'motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith'; (2)
when the tribal court action is 'patently violative of express
jurisdictional prohibitions;' (3) when 'exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the
tribal court's jurisdiction;' and (4) when it is 'plain' that tribal court
jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement 'would
serve no purpose other than delay.' " Elliott [v. White Mountain
Apache Tribal Court}, 566 F.3d [842,] at 847 [(9th Cir. 2009)]
(quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150
L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (internal alteration omitted) ....
To determine whether tribal court jurisdiction is plainly lacking, we
analyze whether such "jurisdiction is colorable or plausible .... "
Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848 (quoting Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court
Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The plausibility of tribal court jurisdiction depends
on the scope of the Tribes' regulatory authority, as "a tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 2709 (quoting Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137
L.Ed.2d 661 (1997)).
Evans, 736 F.3d at 1302.
The Johnsons have not shown that any exception applies.

They have

presented no evidence supporting the first two exceptions. There is no evidence
in the record that would support a finding that the tribal court proceedings were
motivated by a desire to harass or were conducted in bad faith.

Because the

tribal court action arose out of the Tribe's authority to regulate the portion of the
St. Joe River within the reservation boundaries, the tribal court action is not
plainly violative of any express jurisdictional prohibition.
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Concerning the third exception, the Johnsons essentially contend that it
would have been futile to challenge jurisdiction in tribal court because the tribal
ordinance in which the tribe claims control over the riverbed was enacted by the
Tribe. They allege that the Tribe is biased on questions of ownership regarding
the submerged lands beneath the St. Joe River. They contend that the tribal
court is dominated by tribal government, the plaintiff in the case. These bare
allegations are not supported by the record in this case. The tribal court gave the
Johnsons notice and an opportunity to be heard.

No evidence has been

presented that this notice and opportunity to be heard would not have been
adequate for the Johnsons to present competent evidence supporting their claim
that their dock was not located on the area of the riverbed lawfully controlled by
the tribe, or otherwise challenge the assertion of jurisdiction over them in this
case by the tribal court. An example of another approach to challenging a tribal
court's jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant is County of Lewis v. Allen, 163
F.3d 509, (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, a tribal member filed a civil action in the
Nez Perce Tribal Court seeking damages against Lewis County and several nonIndian law enforcement officers. Rather than ignore the proceedings, the nonIndian defendants challenged the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over them
every step of the way, eventually obtaining a ruling that the tribal court did not
have jurisdiction and invalidated the jury verdict against the defendants. The
entire process only took eleven years.
With regard to the fourth exception, Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v.
'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F .3d 1196 (9th Cir.2013), cited by the Tribe, the court
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considered whether the jurisdiction of the Hualapai tribal court was plainly
lacking. That court held:
[A]lthough the main rule in Montana v. United States, [450 U.S.
544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981)] is that a tribal court
lacks regulatory authority over the activities of non-Indians unless
one of its two exceptions apply, this case is not Montana. Montana,
450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245. Montana considered tribal
jurisdiction over nonmember activities on non-Indian land, held in
fee simple, within a reservation. Id. at 547, 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245.
The land underlying this case, however, is federal Indian land held
in trust for the Hualapai Tribe. The dispute arose out of an
agreement related to the development, operations, and
management of the Skywalk, an asset located in Indian country.
With the exception of Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct.
2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001), the Supreme Court has applied
Montana "almost exclusively to questions of jurisdiction arising on
non-Indian land or its equivalent."
Water Wheel [Camp
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance], 642 F.3d [802,] at 809 [(9th
Cir.2011)].
When deciding whether a tribal court has
jurisdiction, land ownership may sometimes prove dispositive,
but when a competing state interest exists courts balance that
interest against the tribe's. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360, 370, 121
S.Ct. 2304. Here, as the dispute centers on Hualapai trust land
and there are no obvious state interests at play, the Hicks
exception is unlikely to require Montana's application. At the very
least, it cannot be said that the tribal court plainly lacks jurisdiction.
Grand Canyon Skywalk at 1205 (emphasis added).
The Johnsons have not shown a state interest that competes with the
tribe's interest in regulating docks located on the riverbed controlled by the tribe.
The Johnsons contend, however, that their dock is not located on an area of the
riverbed that is lawfully controlled by the tribe.

This argument was never

presented to the tribal court by the Johnsons. The Johnsons argument may have
a legal and factual basis, but it should have been presented to the tribal court in
the first instance.
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Defendant Kenneth Johnson has submitted an affidavit. apparently in
support of this argument. Johnson states that he removed part of the dock, but
he has not supplied any evidence concerning when this occurred.
The tribe has moved to strike this affidavit. It argues that Johnson has not
shown competence to make certain statements contained therein.

Included in

the affidavit are water levels as measured by Johnson on certain pilings in the
riverbed. The affidavit makes reference to certain markings on the pilings that
are apparently depicted in images attached to the affidavit. To the extent that the
images and affidavit depict measurements of the distance between the bed of the
river and the surface of the water as it came in contact with those pilings,
Johnson is likely competent to make such measurements and to state what those
measurements were.
Johnson also set out his observation of a measurement of the elevation of
the surface of the river allegedly contained on the website of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The affidavit does not indicate where
this measurement was allegedly taken by NOAA. A river, by definition, would
have a higher elevation at its source than at its mouth. Johnson does not allege
that NOAA measured the elevation of the surface of the river where his property
is located. It therefore does not prove such a fact.
Moreover, as the tribe contends, it is hearsay. The Johnson's argue that it
is within the public records hearsay exception, citing Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co.,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.N.H.2011), aff'd sub nom. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm.
Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 186 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2013)
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which admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8) and 902 the f()U~wing
document: John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, Analysis and

recommendations for Agency action regarding NSAIDs and cardiovascular risk
12 (Apr. 6, 2005) as posted on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's website.
Plaintiff does not submit any public record however.

Instead, he submits his

observations of an alleged public record. Therefore, even if the alleged record
itself were admissible, Johnson's hearsay statement concerning that alleged
record would not, in turn, be admissible.

Johnson's statement concerning

NOAA's website should therefore be stricken.
Johnson states, in addition, that NOAA's measurement is "four inches
below the summer river level." No foundation is laid for Johnson's opinion of the
"summer river level," and it is based upon inadmissible hearsay concerning
NOAA's website. As such, this statement should be stricken as well.
The Johnsons have not shown that their dock has not been located at any
relevant time on the riverbed lawfully controlled by the tribe.

They have not

shown that the tribe's jurisdiction was plainly lacking, not colorable, or
implausible.
Where a party to a state court action fails to exhaust his remedies in a
prior tribal court action, full faith and credit principles require enforcement of the
tribal judgment. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1007-08 (Alaska 2014).
Since the Johnsons did not exhaust their remedies in tribal court, and since no
exception to the exhaustion rule has been shown to apply, full faith and credit
should be extended to the tribal court judgment against them.
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The Johnsons also generally allege that the tribal court was biased
against them.

Bias does not appear to be a relevant consideration in this

context. Stewart v. Stewart, 289 S.E.2d 652 (W.Va.1980) stated:
[l]n Morris Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. 80,
84, 361 A.2d 660,663 (1976) ... a New York judgment was sought
to be enforced in Pennsylvania. The contention was made that the
New York judgment was based on a New York arbitration award
which had been rendered by biased arbitrators and that the award
therefore violated due process concepts. The court in declining to
permit this attack against full faith and credit principles stated:
[E]ven were we to conclude that the appearance of
bias in arbitrators is a denial of due process, we could
not permit the collateral attack on the judgment
attempted by appellees in this case. The cases cited
by appellees for the proposition that a judgment
obtained in violation of due process is not entitled to
full faith and credit are not on point. In those cases,
the due process denied had the result of depriving the
litigant of an opportunity to appear and defend. See
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed.
635, reh. denied, 328 U.S. 876, 66 S.Ct. 975, 90
L.Ed. 1645 (1946); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61
S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940); Wetmore v. Karrick,
205 U.S. 141, 27 S.Ct. 434, 51 L.Ed. 745 (1907).
Stewart, 289 S.E.2d at 656.
Even if bias were relevant, the Johnsons have not shown bias here. They
claim "the tribal court is dominated by the tribal government" which is allegedly
"biased" due to a tribal law providing for a $500 per day fine. A maximum fine
applicable to all dock owners who violate tribal law concerning those docks does
not show bias against the Johnsons.

Moreover, this allegation of bias is

undermined by the fact that the tribe actually fined them a lesser $100 per day
amount instead. In addition, the Johnsons claim bias is shown by the fact that
the tribe claims control of the riverbed. The existence of such a claim does not
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show that the tribe would also exert regulatory control over areas of the riverbed
that it knows are not held in trust for the tribe.
8(3)Does the Penal Law Rule prohibit recognition and enforcement of the
Tribal Court Judgment?

The Johnsons claim the penal law rule, which prohibits enforcement of the
penal judgments of other countries where there is no treaty for such
enforcement, also prohibits enforcement of the tribal court judgment here. They
have not provided any authority that this rule is applicable to tribal judgments,
and independent research by the court has revealed none.
judgment in this case is not a penal judgment in any event.

The tribal court
The judgment

imposes a civil fine and allows for removal of a dock and pilings. The Johnsons
are not subject to criminal prosecution or incarceration pursuant to the tribal court
judgment.
CONCLUSION
This Memorandum Opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment of the
Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260 is RECOGNIZED
AS VALID AND FULLY ENFORCEABLE under the laws of the State of Idaho.

,--

DATED this

J~

day of July, 2016.

19

\5~

I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent this
of July, 2016, as follows:

\:5:" day

Norman M. Semanko
Sarah A. McCormack
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rick & Fields, Chartered
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 385-5384
_JS_ via e-mail: norm@iwua.org & sam@moffatt.com
_ _ via fax: (208) 385-5384
via first class mail
Everett 8. Coulter Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
via e-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com
_ _ via fax: (509) 455-3632
via first class mail

.X-

DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of Court

By:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DI~ .RICT
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
CASE NO. CV-2016-"aiE

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The plaintiff's Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment is granted.

,Dated this

'~

day of July, 2016.
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I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent this
July, 2016, as follows:

l':S

Norman M. Semanko
Sarah A. McCormack
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rick & Fields, Chartered
th
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10 Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 385-5384
_Jf_ via e-mail: norm@iwua.org & sam@moffatt.com
_ _ via fax: (208) 385-5384
via first class mail
Everett B. Coulter Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
via e-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com
_ _ via fax: (509) 455-3632
via first class mail

_/,,:i._

DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of Court

a

By

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIALZrtbt~~ ,-,. 1! I[ u !
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTg'yP~H .:L

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally CASE NO. CV-2016-~5
recognized Indian Tribe,

ORDER STAYING ENFORCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.

KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,

Defendants.

The Court has now entered a Final Judgment in this case. Pursuant to
Idaho Code § 10-1303(c), enforcement of the judgment can begin five days
after the judgment is filed.
This case is very important to the Johnsons and to others who may be
similarly situated. They have raised legitimate questions regarding the
enforceability of the tribal court judgment entered against them. This case is
also very important to the Tribe because it may have an impact on the Tribe's
ability to enforce the Tribe's regulations relating to Coeur d'Alene Lake and

1

1_

1

the St. Joe River against non-tribal members. Both sides potentially have a lot
at stake.
The Court has reviewed an enormous amount of legal research and case
law relating to the issues in this case. The Court has attempted to make the
correct decision in light of Idaho law and existing precedent. The Court is
also aware that there are valid arguments being presented by both sides. If
reviewed on appeal, the Court's decision may be reversed or modified by an
appellate court. It could also be affirmed. The parties now a have the Court's
opinion to review and they should have time to evaluate what steps they may
wish to take, or not take, in the future with regard to the judgment in this case.
To alleviate the potential pressure of the five day waiting period and
looming enforcement proceedings, the court is exercising its discretion and
granting a stay of enforcement proceedings pursuant to I.R.C.P. 62. The stay
may be conditioned for the security of the adverse party "as are proper." The
court finds that an appropriate condition would be to make the stay
temporary, rather than open ended in length. The court does not find it
appropriate to require the Johnsons to post any additional security in support
of the temporary stay.
Enforcement proceedings shall be stayed for 42 days from the date of the
judgment in this case. The stay shall automatically be lifted at the end of the
42 days unless otherwise ordered by the court.
The Court would also encourage the parties to consider attempting to
resolve the case without engaging in protracted litigation. The parties may
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wish to consider the use of a mediator to assist them in resolving this case.
The litigation process can be lengthy, costly, and sometimes ends with a
result that neither party likes. With litigation, the parties lose all control over
the outcome of the case. With mediation, the parties retain control over the
outcome. Both parties may benefit, in the long run, by an agreement in this
case.

Dated this

--

/ 5 day of July, 2016.

SCOTT WAYMAN
District Judge
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I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent this
of July, 2016, as follows:
Norman M. Semanko
Sarah A. McCormack
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rick & Fields, Chartered
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 385-5384
_&_ via e-mail: norm@iwua.org & sam@moffatt.com
_ _ via fax: (208) 385-5384
via first class mail
Everett B. Coulter Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818 W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
_J{_ via e-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com
_ _ via fax: (509) 455-3632
via first class mail

DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of Court
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Matthew J. McGee, ISB No. 7979
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-
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__.DEPUTY
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Post Office Box 829
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Telephone (208) 345-2000
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nms@moffatt.com
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sam@moffatt.com
26575.0000
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

CODER D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. CV-2016-0025

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants-Appellants.

TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
PARTIES TO THE CASE AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN:
1.

The above-named Appellants, Kenneth and Donna Johnson (the

"Johnsons"), appeal against the above-named Respondent, Couer d'Alene Tribe (the "Tribe"), to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered by the district court in the above-

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

Client:4224096.1

\

loO

entitled action, District Judge Scott Wayman presiding, on July 15, 2016, including the Court's
Memorandum Opinion of the same date.
2.

The Johnsons have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgment described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 1 l(a)(l).
3.

The issues on appeal include:
(a)

Whether the district court erred by recognizing the tribal judgment

(b)

Whether the district court erred by holding that the Johnsons

against the Johnsons;

cannot collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the tribal court to enter the tribal judgment subject to
domestication in the above-entitled action because the Johnsons failed to present such
jurisdictional challenge to the tribal court;
(c)

Whether the district court erred when it did not account for the fact

that the extent of the Tribe's jurisdiction is limited solely to submerged lands in which the Tribe
holds an ownership interest;
(d)

Whether the district court abused its discretion by accepting the

tribal court's jurisdictional determination when the scope and extent of the tribal court's
jurisdiction is the subject of litigation in another case pending in Idaho district court;
(e)

Whether the district court erred by giving effect to a tribal

judgment enforcing the penal and revenue laws of the Tribe, including fines and penalties;
(f)

Whether the tribal judgment is entitled to full faith and credit or

comity in Idaho courts;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Client:4224096.1
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(g)

Whether the tribal judgment for civil penalties allegedly owed to

the Tribe may be enforced pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq.;
(h)

Whether the tribal judgment allowing the Tribe's removal of

encroachments may be enforced pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1301 et seq.; and
(i)

Whether the district court properly struck certain testimony offered

by the Johnsons in support of their asserted jurisdictional challenge.
4.

The Appellants request the preparation of the reporter's standard transcript

as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 25(a), which recorded the pending motions hearings on
May 13, 2016, and June 10, 2016, respectively.
5.

The Appellants request the preparation of the clerk's record in accordance

with Idaho Appellate Rule 28, as well as the following additional documents:
(a)

The Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated

(b)

The Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Order of

March 4, 2016;

Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated March 4, 2016;
(c)

The Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Order of

Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated May 6, 2016;
(d)

The Tribe's Reply in Support of Motion for Order of Recognition

of Foreign Judgment, dated May 20, 2016;
(e)

The Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson in Opposition to Plaintiffs

Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment, dated June 1, 2016;
(f)

The Tribe's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson, dated

June 6, 2016;

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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(g)

The Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Strike

Affidavit of Kenneth Johnson, dated June 8, 2016;
(h)

The Memorandum Opinion, dated July 15, 2016; and

(i)

Any and all other documents filed with the Court applicable to the

June 10, 2016, hearing on the motions.
6.

I certify:
(~)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fees

reporter;

for preparation of the reporter's transcript as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 24;
(c)

That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record have

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

been paid;

pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this

'2...-s'day of August, 2016.
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

, _____
t1._.
By_-_
_ _ _ __

Norman M. Semanko-2£:!1 e1Firm
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'1-(

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of August, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Everett B. Coulter Jr.
Ev ANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, PS
818 W. Riverside, Suite 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
Facsimile (509) 455-3632
Attorneys for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5

.(>4-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DI . .RICT
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
CASE NO. CV-2016-.:a,5

Plaintiff,

vs.
JUDGMENT
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The plaintiffs Motion for Order of Recognition of Foreign Judgment is granted.

,Dated this

/ 5> day of July, 2016.
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· I hereby certify a true ari-... .;orrect copy of the foregoing was!
July, 2016, as follows:

.,nt this

\'5

day of

Norman M. Semanko
Sarah A. McCormack
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rick & Fields, Chartered
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 385-5384
-2f_ via e-mail: norm@iwua.org & sam@moffatt.com
_ _ via fax: (208) 385-5384
via first class mail
Everett 8. Coulter Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.
818. W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
via e-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com
_ _ via fax: (509) 455-3632 ·
via first class mail

$-

DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of Court

By:

6

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F°tRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,

I
I
I
I CASE NO. CV-2016-25
I

I MEMORANDUM OPINION

vs.

I

I
I
Defendants.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ II
KENNETH and DONNA JOHNSON,

I
INTRODUCTION

Every year, in courts all across the State of Idaho, judgments entered in
\

other state courts and federal courts are enforced in Idaho pursuant to the

.

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

I.C. §10-1301 et. seq.

This case

presents the question whether a judgment by the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court
against a non-tribal member may be enforced in similar fashion.

While the

question is simple to state, the answer is not so simple. The answer involves the
,.

interplay of state law, federal law, and tribal law. The answer also involves the

1
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examination of state "'"'Urt decisions, federal court decisi,....:,s and tribal court
I

(

J

decisions.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe requests recognition of a default judgment issued
by its tribal court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260, fining defendants Kenneth
and Donna Johnson, and entitling the Tribe to remove a dock encroaching on a
riverbed held in trust for the tribe by th~ federal government.

See, Idaho v.

United States, 533 U.S. 262, 121 S. Ct. 21:35, 150 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2001). The

Johnsons oppose recognition of the judgment.
This appears to be a case of first impression in Idaho. · Neither party has
cited the court to a controlling opinion from an Idaho appellate court. Nor has the
Court's research found any controlling legal authority.

II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff is the Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe), a federally recognized
Indian Tribe.

The defendants, Kenneth and Donna Johnson, (the Johnsons),

own river front real property on the St. Joe River in Benewah County.

The

Johnsons have a dock and pilings that extend into the river from their property.
The Johnsons are not members of the Tribe.

The Tribe does not own the

Johnson's real property.
The Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Johnsons in the tribal court of the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe seeking damages and removal of the Johnson's dock
because the Johnsons did not obtain a dock permit from the Tribe to allow them
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encroacn upon 1ary"~ controlled by the fribe: the subrr--qed lands beneath
'

I

the St. Joe River within the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Tribal Reservation.
Although the Johnsons were served with the summons and complaint in the tribal
court proceeding, they did not appear or answer. As a result of their failure to
appear in the tribal court proceeding, a default judgment was entered against
them imposing a civil penalty of $17,400 and entitling the Tribe to remove the
encroachments.
The tribal court judgment was entered on April 1, 2015.

It remains

I

unsatisfied.
On January 22, 2016 the Tribe filed an Affidavit/Petition for Recognition of
Foreign Judgment seeking an order validating and recognizing the tribal court
judgment in order to ~egin enforcement efforts.

The Tribe has satisfied the

procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq. by filing a certified copy of the
tribal court judgment and supporting affidavit. After receiving notice of the filing
of the judgment, the Johnsons retained counsel and have objected to the Tribe's
request to have the tribal court judgment recognized by the State of Idaho.
Both parties have submitted legal memoranda in support of their
respective positions. Both parties have submitted supporting affidavits.
Tribe has moved

The

to strike the affidavit of Kenneth Johnson on the basis that it

was untimely filed, is irrelevant, and contains hearsay. The Court will not strike
the affidavit, but- the Court will only consider the portions of the affidavit that
would be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

3

Ill
ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN ORDER
RECOGNIZING A JUDGMENT FROM THE COEUR D'ALENE TRIBAL COURT
AGAINST A NON-TRIBAL 'MEMBER FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT.

IV
DISCUSSION

A The Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Motion
The Tribe's legal position is very straight forwa_rd.

Pursuant to the

decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard v Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655
P.2d 895, (1982), tribal court decrees are entitled to full faith and credit. The
Tribe has satisfied the procedural requirements of I.C. §10-1301 et seq, and is
now entitled to enforce the tribal court judgment in state court.
The application of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in most
cases is simply a ministerial act as long a judgment creditor complies with the
procedural requirements of the act. Enforcement of the foreign judgment can
begin five days after the date the judgment is filed. I.C. §10-1303(c).

The Tribe

has not sought to enforce its judgment. Instead, and to the credit of both parties,
the Johnsons and the Tribe have sought a court ruling before any enforcement
actions have been sought based upon the tribal court judgment.
Whether or not an Idaho court will recognize a foreign judgment is a
discretionary determination.

Even if all of the procedural requi~ements of the

Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act have been satisfied, an Idaho court is not
required to recognize a foreign judgment if the foreign judgment is not entitled to
full faith and credit in this state. For example, if the court issuing the foreign
4
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judgment allegedly di,.' 1ot have personal jurisdiction over
i
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Idaho defendant,

'

the Idaho Court can inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's
decision to see whether the judgment is entitled to full_faith and credit. Schwilling
v. Hotne, 105 Idaho 294, 669 P.2d 183,(1983). A similar challenge can be made

to enforcement of a foreign judgment on the basis of a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction by the foreign court. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624,
596 P.2d 1068, (1978).
Once the foreign judgment has been filed and recognized in Idaho, the
judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses,
and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district
court of this state. I.C. §10-1302.

If the foreign judgment has been reversed or

modified by the issuing state, the Idaho court has the discretion to deny
enforcement of the foreign judgment.

P & R Enterprises, Inc. v. Guard, 102

Idaho 671,637 P. 2d 1167, (1981).

B. The Johnson's Objections
The Johnsons arguments against recognizing the tribal court judgment
against them may be summarized as follows. First, they contend that the tribal
court judgment cannot be recognized under the plain language of I. C. §10-1301.
Second, they argue that the tribal court judgment should not be given full faith
and credit ,or be recognized as a matter of comity, because the tribal· court
lacked both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and that the
Johnson's were denied due process of law. Third, they argue that enforcement
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rne tnbal court judrl""lent is prohibited by. the penal law -· ,ie. Each of these

challenges will be addressed below.

8(1) Can a Tribal Court judgment be recognized under Idaho Code §101301?

The Johnsons argue that the tribal judgment cannot be recognized by the
state pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1301, which, according to the Johnsons, is
limited to judgments regarding support or the establishment of paternity. That
provision states:
In this act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order
of a court of the United States or of any other court Q! an order of
an administrative body of any state regarding the support of a child,
spouse, or former spouse or the establishment of paternity which is
entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
(Emphasis added.) As the tribe argues, because the disjunctive conjunction "or"
precedes the referenced language, the limitations therein apply only to
administrative bodies, not courts.
The tribe notes that Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 7, 655 P.2d 895,
901 (1982) held: 'Tribal court decrees ... are ... entitled to full faith and credit."
The Johnsons contend that Sheppard was based upon an interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1738 which has since been "supplanted" by courts in other jurisdictions.
These courts have held that "judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory

or

Possession,"

tribal court proceedings.

as

set

out

in

the

statute,

do

not include

The Sheppard court noted the existence of such

authority, but chose specifically not to follow it. The court held: .

TWTe agree with those courts which have found the
phrase "Territories and Possessions" broad enough to
6

include 'ridian tribes·,-··ac-least ·as ··they ~re presently
constitu{
under the laws: of the United Stai
Jim v. CIT
Financial Services, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975); In re
Adoption of Buehl, 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976);
Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir.1897); but see
Brown v. Babbit Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689
(Ariz.App.1977) (tribal decrees entitled to comity but not full
faith and credit); In re Marriage of Red Fox, 23 Or.App. 393,
542 P.2d 918 (1975). See generally Ragsdale, Problems in
the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7
N.M.L.Rev. 133 (1977); Comment, Conflicts Between State
and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith and Credit
Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 Ariz.St.L.J. 801 (1981).
We believe that this holding will facilitate better relations
between the courts of this state and the various tribal courts
within Idaho.
Sheppard, 104 Idaho at 8, 655 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added). In footnote 2, the

court stated:
It has come to the attention of this Court that, in an acti_on
related to this case, the Shoshone-Bannock appellate court, in
reversing the tribal trial court, held that it was not required to
give full faith and credit to the decrees of Idaho state courts. In
part this decision was based on the belief that state courts
did not accord tribal courts full faith and credit. As we have
shown, some state courts. including this one. do. Secondly,
the tribal court failed to acknowledge 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which
requires "every court within the United States" to give full faith
and credit to decrees of state courts. Along with this opinion
extends the hope of a good working relationship between state
and tribal courts, and we hope, therefore, that the ShoshoneBannock courts will reconsider the application of full faith and
credit in their proceedings.
Indeed the commentators
unanimously agree that tribal courts must afford other states full
faith and credit.
Id. fn. 2 (emphasis added).
The Johnsons claim that because Sheppard involved a tribal court decree of

adoption, the decision in Sheppard to accord tribal judgments full faith and credit
was limited to family law judgments only.

Nothing in the opinion, however,

limited full faith and credit in that manner. Sheppard has not been overturned or
7
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uy a 1a1er opinion by the Idaho appellate courts. ,-,.,e district courts are
'·

bound to follow the pronouncements of the appellate courts. Sheppard is
controlling precedent in Idaho and the rule of stare decisis dictates that lower
courts follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be
unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houghland Farms, Inc. v.

Johnson, 119 Idaho 97, 803 P. 2d 978, (1990). The Idaho Supreme Court, not
the district court, is the only court that can decide whether or not the Sheppard
case is manifestly wrong, has proven to be unjust or unwise over time, or must
be overruled to remedy an ·injustice.
Based on the plain language of I.C. §10-1031 and upon the Sheppard
case, the court finds that tribal court judgments may be enforced under the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.

However, just because tribal court

judgments can be enforced under this act does not necessarily mean that the
judgment against the Johnsons is enforceable in this case.

B(2)

Did the tribal court have both subject matter jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction over the Johnsons to allow an Idaho court to grant full faith
and credit to the tribal court judgment?
The Johnson's claim that the tribal court judgment should not be
enforceable against them because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
judgment. A judgment entered by a foreign state that lacked personal or subject
matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment is void, and should not be accorded full

8
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ta,m and creait. ::,cnw;m11g v. Horne, 105.Jdaho-294, 669 P,"'--l 183 (1983);-Sierra
Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 596 P.2d 1068, (1978). The Johnsons
cite to Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, (9th Cir. 1997) in support of their
position. This Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision is based upon federal law,
not state law, so it is not controlling in Idaho in light of the Sheppard case. Even if
principles of comity outlined in Wilson v. Marchington applied to this case, the
analysis is the same: if the tribal court lacked proper subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, then the judgment should not be recognized and enforced.
Tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal members is a rather controversial
subject. The United States Supreme Court has attempted to clarify this area of
the law in a series of decisions beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 431 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), superseded on other
grounds by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (1990). In Oliphant, the Court specifically
held that a tribal court has no jurisdiction to criminally charge or incarcerate nonIndians. Later cases have established a set of precedents that impose limitations
on the ability of a tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-tribal member in a
civil case.
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d
493 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to non-members of the tribe. The court
also held that there are two exceptions to this rule. They are commonly referred
to as "the consensual relations" exception and the "direct effects" exception.
Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal
authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it
relied support the general proposition that the inherent

9
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activities1 10nmembers of the tribe. To be sur, ,1dian
tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements.(citations omitted) A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct eff~ct on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. (citations
omitted)

Montana v United States, 450 U.S. 455, (1981), at 565-566 (citations and
footnote omitted).

There is no basis for applying the "consensual relations" exception here.
The Johnson--s have done nothing to support a finding that they have engaged in
consensual relationships with the Tribe or its members in any way, shape, or
form.

This case does not arise out of a business transaction or a contract

between the Johnsons and the Tribe or its members. They have not agreed to
submit to the tribal court's jurisdiction. They are not tribal members. The Tribe
does not own their land.

As non-tribal members they have no say in tribal

government issues, including any lake regulations and the operation of the tribal
court system.
The second exception of Montana v. United States is more problematic.
Under this exception, a tribe may als~ retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when ·
10
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thC~-.:OndC.-:~-tjthr6 .......... , 1s '-'• , .as -;:,v,, ,e du tvCefttu on u 1e pnliucar integmy, the
economic security, or the health and welfar~ of the tribe. Id. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the Tribe to regulate that portion
of the bed and the banks of the St. Joe River that lie within the Coeur d'Alene
reservation. See, Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 121 S. Ct. 2135, 150 L.
Ed. 2d 326 (2001 ).

The Tribe's ability to regulate the activities affecting Coeur

d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River, such as encroachments, water quality, or
other use of the natural resources, is an important aspect of the treaty rights that
were recognized by the court. If the non-Indians who used the lake, or the river,
or more specifically to this case, those who allegedly encroach on the submerged
bed and banks of the waterways were not subject to the Tribe's rules, then the
ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. United States would
certainly be a hollow victory for the Tribe. Any non-Indian could simply thumb
their nose at the tribal enforcement efforts without any risk of consequence. The
regulatory authority of the tribe would be meaningless with regard to non-Indians.
The lake and the St Joe River are important to the tribe and the inability to control
the conduct of non-Indians when it directly affects the lake and the St Joe River
fall within the category of conduct that threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.
This is not the first time an Indian tribe has exercised regulatory control
over a waterway pursuant to treaty rights granted long ago. The Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation were involved in a long
running battle over the control of a portion of Flathead Lake. See, Confederated

11

r--~·

0u,,.,11 a1 ,u nOOtf:j11a1

T~;1ies of the /-lathe.ad ReseJVation v. t- '-=tmen, 665 F.2d 951

(1982). After years of litigation, the tribe's right to control the activities of nontribal members was recognized when the activities affected that portion of
Flathead Lake within the reservation boundaries. Much like the tribes involved
with Flathead Lake, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe is exercising similar control over that
portion of the bed and banks of the lake and the St. Joe River within the
reservation.
There is another reason why the tribal court judgment in this case should
be given full faith and credit, or be recognized as a matter of comity as is done in
the federal court system. When a non-Indian defendant is sued in a tribal court
and wishes to challenge the ability of the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction over
them, the non-Indian defendant is normally required to challenge the tribal court's
jurisdiction over them in the tribal court and exhaust all tribal remedies through
every level of the tribal court system before they will be allowed to raise the
jurisdictional issue in another forum. Nat'/ Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe

of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985).
The Johnsons never appeared in tribal court to raise a jurisdictional
challenge. The tribal court judgment in this case made a specific finding that it
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, and that the Johnsons
were given notice of the suit and the opportunity to appear. The tribe contends
that the tribal court judgment is entitled to full faith and credit because the
Johnsons failed to exhaust their remedies in tribal court before challenging
recognition of the tribal judgment in state court. Evans v. . Shoshone-Bannock

12
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LEI/JU Use ,--a/icy Lrorrnin;-736 f-.3d 1298;-·1302 (9th c-,--?013) set out four
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. The court stated:
"Exhaustion is prudential; it is required as a matter of comity, not as
a jurisdictional prerequisite." Boozer [v. Wilder], 381 F.3d [931,] at
935 [9th Cir. 2004)] (citations omitted). To this end, the Supreme
Court has recognized four exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement: "(1) when an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is
'motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith'; (2)
when the tribal court action is 'patently violative of express
jurisdictional prohibitions;' (3) when 'exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the
tribal court's jurisdiction;' and (4) when it is 'plain' that tribal court
jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement 'would
serve no purpose other than delay.' " Elliott [v. White Mountain
Apache Tribal Court], 566 F.3d [842,] at 847 [(9th Cir. 2009)]
(quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150
L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (internal alteration omitted) ....

To determine whether tribal court jurisdiction is plainly lacking, we
analyze whether such "jurisdiction is colorable or plausible . . . ."
Elliott, 566 F.3d at 848 (quoting Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court
Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The plausibility of tribal court jurisdiction depends
on the scope of the Tribes' regulatory authority, as "a tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."
Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 2709 (quoting Strate
v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137

l.Ed.2d 661 (1997)).
Evans, 736 F.3d at 1302.
The Johnsons have not shown that any exception applies.

They have

presented no evidence supporting the first two exceptions. There is no evidence
in the record that would support a finding that the tribal court proceedings were
motivated by a desire to harass or were conducted in bad faith. Because the
tribal court action arose out of the Tribe's authority to regulate the portion of the
St. Joe River within the reservation boundaries, the tribal court action is not
plainly violative of any express jurisdictional prohibition.

13
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would have been futile to challenge jurisdiction in tribal court because the tribal
ordimmce in which the tribe claims control over the riverbed was enacted by the
Tribe. They allege that the Tribe is biased on questions of ownership regarding
the submerged lands beneath the St. Joe River. They contend that the tribal
court is dominated by tribal government, the plaintiff in the case. These bare
allegations are not supported by the record in this case. The tribal court gave the
Johnsons notice and an opportunity to be heard.

No evidence has been

presented that this notice and opportunity to be heard would not have been
adequate for the Johnsons to present competent
evidence supporting .their claim
.
that their dock was not located on· the area of the riverbed lawfully controlled by
the tribe, or otherwise challenge the assertion of jurisdiction over them in this
case by the tribal court. An example of another approach to challenging a tribal
court's jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant is County of Lewis v. Allen, 163
F.3d 509, (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, a tribal member filed a civil action in the
Nez Perce Tribal Court seeking damages against Lewis County and several nonIndian law enforcement officers. Rather than ignore the proceedings, the nonIndian defendants challenged the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over them
every step of the way, eventually obtaining a ruling that the tribal court did not

have jurisdiction and invalidated the jury verdict against the defendants. The
entire process only took eleven years.
With regard to the fourth exception, Grand Canyon Skywa/k Dev., LLC

v.

'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.2013), cited by the Tribe, the court
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lacking. That court held:
[A]lthough the main rule in Montana v. United States, [450 U.S.
544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981)] is that a tribal court
lacks regulatory authority over the activities of non-Indians unless
one of its two exceptions apply, this case is not Montana. Montana,
450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245. Montana considered tribal
jurisdiction over nonmember activities on non-Indian land, held in
fee simple, within a reservation. Id. at 547, 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245.
The land underlying this case, however, is federal Indian land held
in trust for the Hualapai Tribe. The dispute arose out of an
agreement related to the development, operations, and
management of the Skywalk, an asset located in Indian country.
With the exception of Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct.
2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001), the Supreme Court has applied
Montana "almost exclusively to questions of jurisdiction arising on
Water Wheel [Camp
non-Indian land or its equivalent."
Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance], 642 F.3d [802,] at 809 [(9th
Cir.2011)].
When deciding whether a tribal court has
iurisdiction. land ownership may sometimes prove dispositive,
. but when a competing state interest exists courts balance that
interest against the tribe's. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360, 370, 121
S.Ct. 2304. Here, as the dispute centers on Hualapai trust land
and there are no obvious state interests at play, the Hicks
exception is unlikely to require Montana's application. At the very
least, it cannot be said that the tribal court plainly lacks jurisdiction.

Grand Canyon Skywalk at 1205 (emphasis added).
The Johnsons have not shown a state interest that competes with the
tribe's interest in regulating docks located on the riverbed controlled by the tribe.
The Johnsons contend, however, that their dock is not located on an area of the
riverbed that is lawfully controlled by the tribe.

This argument was never

presented to the tribal court by the Johnsons. The Johnsons argument may have
a legal and factual basis, but it should have been presented to the tribal ·court in
the first instance.

15

oi::::~JanC"', ~:nni::7-Joh11.:iv1, hc::1:s tiUbrrmced an . affidavit .. apparently in
support of this argument. Johnson states that he removed part of the dock, but
he has not supplied any evidence concerning when this occurred.
The tribe has moved to strike this affidavit. It argues that Johnson has not
shown competence to make certain statements contained therein.

Included in

the affidavit are water levels as measured by Johnson on certain pilings in the
riverbed. The affidavit makes reference to certain markings on the pilings that
are apparently depicted in images attached to the affidavit. To the extent that the
images and affidavit depict measurements of the distance between the bed of the
river and the surface of the water as it came in contact with those pilings,
Johnson is likely competent to make such measurements and to state what those
measurements were.
Johnson also set out his observation of a measurement of the elevation of
the surface of the river allegedly contained on the website of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The affidavit does not indicate where
this measurement was allegedly taken by NOAA. A river, by definition, would
have a higher elevation at its source than at its mouth. Johnson does not allege
that NOAA measured the elevation of the surface of the river where his property
is located. It therefore does not prove such a fact.
Moreover, as the tribe contends, it is hearsay. The Johnson's argue that it
is within the public records hearsay exception, citing Bartlett v. Mut. Phann. Co.,

Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.N.H.2011), affd sub nom. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm .

. Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.2012}, rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 186 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2013}
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document: John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, Analysis and
recommendations for Agency action regarding NSAIDs and cardiovascular risk

12 (Apr. 6, 2005) as posted on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's website.
Plaintiff does not submit any public record however.

Instead, he submits his

observations of an alleged public record. Therefore, even if the alleged record

itself were admissible, Johnson's hearsay statement concerning that alleged
record would not, in turn, be admissible.

Johnson's statement concerning

NOAA's website should therefore be stricken.
Johnson states, in addition, that NOAA's measurement is "four inches
below the summer river level." No foundation is laid for Johnson's opinion of the
"summer river level," and it is based upon inadmissible hearsay concerning
NOAA's website. As such, this statement should be stricken as well.
The Johnsons have not shown that their dock has not been located at any
relevant time on the riverbed lawfully controlled by the tribe.

They have not

shown that the tribe's jurisdiction was plainly lacking, not colorable, or
implausible.
Where a party

to a state court action fails to exhaust his remedies in a

prior tribal court action, full faith and credit principles require enforcement of the

tribal judgment. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1007-08 (Alaska 2014).
Since the Johnsons did not exhaust their remedies in tribal court, and since no
exception to the exhaustion rule has been shown to apply, full faith and credit
should be extended to the tribal court judgment against them.

17

The Johnsons-, <llso generally allege that the trir-'
court was biased
I
against them.

Bias does not appear to be a relevant consideration in this

context. Stewart v. Stewart, 289 S.E.2d 652 (YV.Va.1980) stated:
[l]n Morris Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. 80,
84, 361 A.2d 660, 663 (1976) ... a New York judgment was sought
to be enforced in Pennsylvania. The contention was made that the
New York judgment was based on a New York arbitration award
which had been rendered by biased arbitrators and that the award
therefore violated due process concepts. The court in declining to
permit this attack against full faith and credit principles stated:

[E]ven were we to conclude that the appearance of
bias in arbitrators is a denial of due process, we could
not permit the collateral attack on the judgment
attempted by appellees in this case. The cases cited
by appellees for the proposition that a judgment
obtained in violation of due process is not entitled to
full faith and credit are not on point. In those cases,
the due process denied had the result of depriving the
litigant of an opportunity to appear and defend. See
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed.
635, reh. denied, 328 U.S. 876, 66 S.Ct. 975, 90
L.Ed. 1645 (1946); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61
S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940); Wetmore v. Karrick,
205 U.S. 141, 27 S.Ct. 434, 51 L.Ed. 745 (1907).

Stewart, 289 S.E.2d at 656.
Even if bias were relevant, the Johnsons have not shown bias here. They
claim "the tribal court is dominated by the tribal government" which is allegedly
"biased" due to a tribal law providing for a $500 per day fine. A maximum fine
applicable to all dock owners who violate tribal law concerning those docks does
not show bias against the Johnsons.

Moreover, this allegation of bias is

undermined by the fact that the tribe actually fined them a lesser $100 per day
amount instead. In addition, the Johnsons claim bias is shown by the fact that

the tribe claims control of the riverbed. The existence of such a claim does not
18

that it knows are not held in trust for the tribe.

8(3)0oes the Penal Law Rule prohibit recognition and enforcement of the
Tribal Court Judgment?

The Johnsons claim the penal law rule, which prohibits enforcement of the
penal judgments of other countries where there is no treaty for such
enforcement, also prohibits enforcement of the tribal court judgment here. They
have not provided any authority that this rule is applicable to tribal judgments,
and independent research by the court has revealed none.
judgment in this case is not a penal judgment in any event.

The tribal court
The judgment

imposes a civil fine and allows for removal of a dock and pilings. The Johnsons
are not subject to criminal prosecution or incarceration pursuant to the tribal court
judgment.
CONCLUSION

This Memorandum Opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment of the
Coeur d'Alene Tribal Court in tribal case no. CV-SC-2014-260 is RECOGNIZED
AS VALID AND FULLY ENFORCEABLE under the laws of the State of Idaho .
DATED this

.--

J~

day of July, 2016.

19

I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent this
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101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box829
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 385-5384
.,!£_ via e-mail: norm@iwua.org & sam@moffatt.com
_ _ via fax: (208) 385-5384
via first class mail
Everett B. Coulter Jr.
Evans, Craven & Lackie, P .S.
818 W. Riverside Avenue, Ste. 250
Spokane, WA 99201-0910
-¥,_ via e-mail: ecoulter@ecl-law.com
__ via fax: (509) 455-3632
via first class mail

DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of Court
By: __d_···_·
__· ~ - - - - - Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY BENEWAH

Coeur D'Alene Tribe, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff /Respondent

vs.

Kenneth Johnson and Donna
Johnson,
Defendant/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DISTRICT COURT NO: CV16-25
SUPREME COURT CASE# 44478
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Benewah, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by _X_ United States mail,_ hand delivery, one copy of the
Clerk's Record and Court Reporter's Transcript to the following Attorney's in this cause as
follows:

Norman Semanko
Attorney for the Appellant
POBOX829
Boise, ID 83701

Peter J. Smith/ Jillian H. Caires
Attorney for the Respondent
1250 W. Ironwood Dr. Ste 316
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

::'WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand the affixed seal of the said Court
this _~~_ _ day of \\,)QUfl\o\tlf2016
DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - I

l~l

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY BENEWAH

Coeur D'Alene Tribe, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff /Respondent

vs.

Kenneth Johnson and Donna
Johnson,
Defendant/Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DISTRICT COURT NO: CV16-25
SUPREME COURT CASE# 44478
CERTIFICATE OF RECORD

I, DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Benewah, do hereby certify that the above
and foregoing record in the above-entitled case was compiled under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. I further certify that the
Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on August 26th, 2016.

Norman Semanko
Attorney for the Appellant
POBOX829
Boise, ID 83701

this

Peter J. Smith/ Jillian H. Caires
Attorney for the Respondent
1250 W. Ironwood Dr. Ste 316
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand the affixed seal of the said Court
day of fvoUlJft\'oc" 2016

@_

DEANNA BRAMBLETT, Clerk of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF RECORD - 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISRICT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BENEWAH

Coeur D'Alene Tribe, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff /Respondent

)

)

DISTRICT COURT NO: CV16-25

)

vs.

)
)

Kenneth Johnson and Donna
Johnson,
Defendant/Appellant

)
)

SUPREME COURT CASE# 44478
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, Deanna Bramblett, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Benewah, do hereby certify that the following is a list of exhibits that
have been lodged with the Supreme Court.
DESCRIPTION

EXHIBIT NO.

Dated

There is No Exhibits in this Case

0

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal of Said Court
)

on the

d

Day of ,DceM~(2016.

i ' ; t·

'', ::· ', \ (i '·; ' .·

' ,,: : "'\

~

Deanna Bramblett
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

-.-

.' l .

CERTIFICATE OF EXIDBITS

I B<=t

